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INTRODUCTION  
―There is definitely going to be another financial crisis around the 
corner because we haven‘t solved any of the things that caused the 
previous crisis,‖ said hedge fund legend Mark Mobius, speaking in Tokyo 
nearly a full year after the United States officially embarked upon the 
greatest reform of financial services regulation since the New Deal.
1
 
Today, the world is still reeling from the recent financial crisis, which 
ravaged even the strongest economies and left them battling recession, 
budget deficits, soaring unemployment, and political discontent.
2
 Facing 
 
 
 1. Kana Nishizawa, Mobius Says Another Financial Crisis ‗Around the Corner‘, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, May 30, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-30/mobius-says-fresh-
financial-crisis-around-corner-amid-volatile-derivatives.html. At the time of his remarks, Mobius was 
the head of the $50-billion emerging markets investments operations at Templeton Asset Management. 
Id. 
 2. For a discussion of the economic and societal costs of the recent financial crisis, see Cheryl 
D. Block, Measuring the True Cost of Government Bailout, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 149, 159 (2010) (―A 
simple tally of dollars authorized or disbursed, of course, is wholly inadequate to accurately assess the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss1/2
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another financial crisis in this situation is a frightening prospect. National 
governments, individually or in any G-denominated combination, may 
simply be out of magic bullets—as well as money and goodwill of their 
citizens—with which to fight the next war.  
In this context, preventing the next financial meltdown becomes a 
survival imperative. To be effective, however, crisis prevention efforts 
must be comprehensive and coherent, and target the fundamental problems 
in financial markets instead of getting mired in the sea of small ―fixes‖ to 
the system. One of the fundamental causes of the recent crisis was the 
unprecedented degree of complexity and interconnectedness in modern 
financial markets, and the woeful inability of both private market actors 
and public authorities to understand and manage the risks these factors 
posed to systemic financial stability.
3
 Complex financial instruments, 
markets, and institutions create levels of opacity, interdependence, and 
unpredictability which significantly increase the potential for market 
inefficiency and systemic failure of dangerous proportions.
4
 Complexity 
enables private market actors to engage in excessive financial speculation 
and tax and regulatory arbitrage, which further increase systemic risk and 
contribute little to productive economic growth. Despite their ambitious 
reach, post-crisis regulatory reforms do not appear to offer effective 
solutions to the fundamental dilemma of regulating complexity and 
systemic risk
5
 in financial markets.
6
 Much of the current academic and 
 
 
ultimate taxpayer cost of government bailouts.‖); Claire R. Kelly, Financial Crises and Civil Society, 
11 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 505 (2011) (describing societal consequences of the financial crisis from a global 
perspective). 
 3. There is a vast collection of literature analyzing the dynamics of risk accumulation in the 
financial system, which ultimately led to the crisis. For a sample of this literature, see generally 
Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008, 23 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 77 (2009); Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis, 21 CRIT. 
REV. 195 (2009); Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic, 15 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 10 (2008); Oren Bar-Gill, 
The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073 
(2009); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943 (2009); see also infra 
note 11. 
 4. For scholarly analyses of complexity in financial markets and its implications for systemic 
stability and efficiency, see, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 
WASH. U. L. REV. 211 (2010); Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation and the Regulation of Modern 
Financial Markets (U. of Oxford Legal Res. Paper No. 49, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1916649; Manuel A. Utset, Complex Financial Institutions and Systemic 
Risk, 45 GA. L. REV. 779 (2011). 
 5. Systemic risk can be defined as the risk ―of widespread failures of financial institutions or 
freezing up of capital markets that can substantially reduce the supply of capital to the real economy.‖ 
Viral V. Acharya et al., Prologue: A Bird‘s-Eye View, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO 
REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 1, 1 (Viral V. Acharya et al. eds., 2009). Another popular definition refers 
to systemic risk as ―the risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers 
(through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
66 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:63 
 
 
 
 
policy debate tends to focus on discrete reform measures, mostly aimed at 
enhancing or finessing the same regulatory tools and approaches that 
failed to prepare us for the devastating effects of the latest crisis.
7
 
Ultimately, these measures fail to answer directly the fundamental 
normative question: how much financial risk is too much for society to 
bear?  
This Article pushes the boundaries of the debate by directly 
confronting that fundamental policy issue. It starts with a simple premise: 
if we cannot effectively regulate and control systemic risk associated with 
the increasing complexity in financial markets, we need to reduce and 
control the overall level of complexity in the system. Because much of that 
risk-generating complexity is a result of strategic efforts of financial 
intermediaries that structure, market, and deal in complex financial 
instruments, the most radical and direct method of reducing systemic risk 
is to insert regulatory controls at the point of product development, before 
the risk is introduced into the financial system. This Article argues that 
one potentially effective form of such ex ante regulatory control is pre-
market government licensing of complex financial instruments—including 
derivatives, asset-backed securities, and other structured products.  
Product approval has long been the model of pharmaceutical drug 
regulation in the United States and has recently been introduced in the 
European Union‘s chemicals regulation. It is not commonly known, 
however, that a similar system of pre-trading ―contract designation‖ also 
existed in the area of the U.S. commodity futures regulation prior to 2000.
8
 
 
 
of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or 
decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-marketplace volatility.‖ Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008). 
 6. See infra notes 57–64 and accompanying text. 
 7. For a provocative critique of the current reform efforts in the United States, see SIMON 
JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, THIRTEEN BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT 
FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010); DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE 
DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES (2010). 
 8. See infra Part II.C. In today‘s financial markets, there are numerous examples of substantive 
review of financial products and transactions by public authorities and various quasi-public and private 
parties. These include merit-based review of securities offerings under state Blue Sky laws, various 
levels of pre-approval of certain insurance policies and rates by state insurance regulators, regulatory 
pre-approval of certain new activities and investments by federally-insured depository institutions and 
their parent companies, and the review of proposed horizontal mergers by the Department of Justice 
and the Federal Trade Commission. See generally PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL 
§§ 5.015.03 (2012) (analyzing limitations on powers and activities of banks and bank holding 
companies); THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 329–34 (Rev. 5th ed. 2006) 
(describing state regulation of securities transactions); RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF 
BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (4th ed. 2009) (detailing regulation of banking organizations 
and insurance companies). Product design assessment also takes place in the process of listing 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss1/2
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Building on these three examples, the Article offers the first 
comprehensive examination of whether, and how, the concept of product 
approval regulation can be applied to reduce systemic risk posed by 
complex financial instruments.
9
  
The core of the proposal advanced in this Article is the process for 
product approval, which would require financial institutions to make an 
affirmative showing that each complex financial product they intend to 
market meets three statutory tests: (1) an ―economic purpose‖ test, which 
would place the burden of proving the social and commercial utility of 
each proposed financial instrument on the financial institutions seeking its 
approval; (2) an ―institutional capacity‖ test, which would require a review 
of the applicant firm‘s ability to effectively manage the risks and monitor 
the market dynamics of the proposed product; and (3) a broad ―systemic 
effects‖ test, which would require a finding that approval of the proposed 
product would not pose an unacceptable risk of increasing systemic 
vulnerability and otherwise will not raise significant public policy 
concerns.  
The proposed approach does not prohibit any financial activities. It 
merely imposes the duty to provide information necessary for evaluating 
potential risks and benefits of a specific financial product on the party that 
has the best access to such information and the greatest incentives not to 
disclose it voluntarily. The proposed approval process would provide a 
mechanism for ensuring that financial innovation and the creation of 
complex financial instruments actually advance productive economic 
enterprise and offer real public benefits. By eliminating socially 
 
 
approval by securities exchanges, issuance of credit ratings by the credit rating agencies, and issuance 
of legal opinions by law firms evaluating the validity and legal effects of specific financial products 
and transactions. In this broader sense, the concept of product approval regulation advocated in this 
Article may be viewed as a variation on this well-established theme in financial services regulation and 
private market ordering. Generally, however, the scope and purposes of these product review schemes 
limit their usefulness as directly comparable models of approval-based risk regulation.  
 9. As discussed below, several proposals for regulatory approval of consumer financial products 
were advanced in 2008–09. The main justification for those proposals was the need to protect ordinary 
Americans from potentially ―unsafe‖ financial products that could damage their financial well-being. 
See infra Part I.C. By contrast, this Article proposes introducing a mandatory licensing scheme for 
complex financial instruments that typically are not sold directly to retail consumers. The primary 
policy focus of the proposed scheme should be prevention of excessive accumulation of systemic risk 
in the financial sector. Recently, Professors Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl advocated a similar idea of 
a licensing regime to reduce speculation in derivatives. Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA for 
Financial Innovation: Applying the Insurable Interest Doctrine to the Twenty-First-Century Financial 
Markets (John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 589, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn 
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2010606. Their proposal, however, differs in several important 
respects from the proposal advanced here and offers the more traditional economic analysis that 
focuses on curbing welfare-reducing financial speculation.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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counterproductive complexity, this approach would also potentially 
enhance the efficiency of financial markets and the reliability of traditional 
mechanisms of private market discipline.  
The proposed model of mandatory approval of complex financial 
products is bound to generate controversy and invite criticism. It raises 
many legitimate questions about the proper scope, feasibility, and potential 
consequences of instituting such an intrusive regulatory scheme. This 
Article does not purport to give complete answers to all of these questions. 
Rather, it offers an intellectual experiment, an exploratory attempt to flesh 
out an idea that may appear too radical and politically untenable today. 
The next big crisis may very well change that perception. 
The Article is structured as follows. Part I sets forth a normative 
justification for an ex ante approach to managing complexity and reducing 
systemic risk in financial markets. Part II examines key features of three 
historical experiments with product approval regulation: pre-approval of 
new drugs by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (―FDA‖), the new 
system of registration and authorization of chemicals in the European 
Union, and a mandatory contract approval scheme administered by the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (―CFTC‖) from 1974 to 2000. 
Part III outlines a proposal for product approval regulation of complex 
financial instruments and transactions. It also discusses some of the key 
criticisms and challenges of implementing this idea in practice. 
I. A CASE FOR PRODUCT APPROVAL REGULATION IN THE FINANCIAL 
SECTOR 
A. Strategic Complexity and Systemic Risk 
The financial crisis of 2007–09 was the first truly global and systemic 
crisis.
10
 Many factors contributed to the accumulation of excess risk and 
hidden leverage in the financial sector, which led to massive near-failure 
and taxpayer-funded bailouts of the world‘s largest financial institutions.11 
 
 
 10. See Saule T. Omarova, The New Crisis for the New Century: Some Observations on the 
―Big-Picture‖ Lessons of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 157 (2009). 
 11. For a sample of detailed analyses of the causes of the financial crisis of 2007–09, see, e.g., 
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM‘N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2011), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fcic/fcic.pdf; UNITED STATES SENATE 
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: 
ANATOMY OF FINANCIAL COLLAPSE (2011) [hereinafter THE LEVIN REPORT], available at 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/Financial_Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf; UNITED KINGDOM‘S 
FIN. SERV. AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss1/2
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One of the fundamental causes of that crisis, however, was the 
unprecedented level of complexity of financial products and markets, 
which resulted from the great successes of financial innovation of the pre-
crisis decades.
12
  
Since the 1980s, rapid proliferation of increasingly complex financial 
instruments, including over-the-counter (―OTC‖) derivatives, asset-backed 
securities, and other structured products, transformed the dynamics of the 
financial sector‘s operation and created a qualitatively new source of 
systemic instability in financial markets.
13
 Derivatives are financial 
instruments whose value derives from the value of other assets, referred to 
as underlying or reference assets.
14
 Anything that has a quantifiable value 
subject to fluctuation can serve as a reference asset, either alone or in an 
endless variety of combinations: interest and currency exchange rates, 
prices of securities or commodities, changes in the creditworthiness of 
third parties, or macroeconomic indicators. Asset-backed securities and 
structured notes also derive their value from the value of underlying assets 
generating streams of payments: pools of mortgages and other loans, 
certain loan-like leases or other asset-backed securities.
15
 In essence, all of 
these instruments enabled unbundling, reconfiguring, and trading of 
financial risk as an asset in its own right, separate from any physical asset 
or financial instrument that initially gave rise to such risk. 
By allowing market actors to tailor investments to their individual risk 
appetites and needs, these instruments unlocked great potential for more 
effective hedging of financial exposure and for greater flow of capital and 
 
 
FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009) [hereinafter TURNER REVIEW], available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ 
other/turner review.pdf. 
 12. Omarova, supra note 10, at 157; Schwarcz, supra note 4; Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation 
Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657 (2012). 
This is not to say that complexity was the sole cause of the financial meltdown in 2007–09. Greed, 
recklessness, incompetence, corruption, and misguided policies all played a role in making it happen. 
The point here is that complexity was one of the key variables that linked many of these ever-present 
factors in a way that created qualitatively new dynamics of risk in the financial system. See infra note 
29. 
 13. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market‘s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis 
Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2011); Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 
2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2011); Margaret M. Blair, Financial Innovation, 
Leverage, Bubbles, and the Distribution of Income, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225 (2010). 
 14. See R. STAFFORD JOHNSON, INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVES: OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND 
SWAPS 1–10 (2009).  
 15. See generally Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of 
Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553 (2008) (examining the mechanism and 
legal basis of securitization); Jonathan C. Lipson, Re: Defining Securitization, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012) (revisiting the definition of securitization). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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liquidity in the market.
16
 By the same token, however, these complex 
financial instruments empowered market participants to engage in highly 
sophisticated financial speculation and regulatory arbitrage that masked 
excessive levels of leverage and risk, thereby threatening systemic 
stability.
17
 This crucial connection between increasing complexity and the 
growth of socially undesirable speculative and arbitrage activities is one of 
the key determinants of systemic risk in the financial sector. 
Complex financial instruments are difficult to understand and value, 
because their risks are not easily measured and controlled.
18
 This is 
attributable to the potential complexity of the specific reference assets
19
 
and the structure of the transactions.
20
 Financial institutions use 
sophisticated, proprietary mathematical models to establish values of 
derivatives and structured instruments.
21
 Although such models‘ accuracy 
and reliability are inherently limited, their availability enables and 
encourages financial engineering of even more complex financial 
instruments.
22
 Opacity and lack of reliable valuation create a heightened 
 
 
 16. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, More than Just ―New Financial Bingo‖: A Risk-Based 
Approach to Understanding Derivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (1997); Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail 
Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996). 
 17. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 
1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 339–41 
(2002). For an economic analysis of socially harmful effects of speculation and arbitrage, see Posner & 
Weyl, supra note 9, at 8–10 (arguing that speculation enables socially-undesirable tax and regulatory 
arbitrage by sophisticated investors, reduces welfare, and contributes to systemic risk). 
 18. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure 
and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1463 (1993) (arguing that 
financial regulators cannot keep up with development of complex derivatives). 
 19. Pools of assets underlying a securitized transaction may contain loans with different 
maturities, different interest rates, and different risk of prepayment or default. See Schwarcz, supra 
note 4, at 217. Derivatives may reference even more complex ―baskets‖ of synthetic exposure to 
various risks. 
 20. For example, the terms of the financial instrument may establish complex payout schemes 
and create additional linkages to other contracts between the same counterparties. See Schwarcz, supra 
note 4, at 220. 
 21. See TURNER REVIEW, supra note 11, at 22. According to this report, 
The very complexity of the mathematics used to measure and manage risk . . . made it 
increasingly difficult for top management and boards to assess and exercise judgment over 
the risks being taken. Mathematical sophistication ended up not containing risk, but providing 
false assurance that other prima facie indicators of increasing risk (e.g., rapid credit extension 
and balance sheet growth) could be safely ignored.  
Id. 
 22. These models fundamentally depend on numerous assumptions that may not hold if 
circumstances change, which happens during crises. Behavioral biases also explain the tendency 
toward over-reliance on models. See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The 
Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. 
REV. 127 (2009); Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss1/2
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danger of misleading or even defrauding market participants.
23
 This 
informational asymmetry also creates an inherently unstable environment, 
as market participants are more likely to over-invest in markets for such 
instruments in good times and then flee them at the first sign of trouble, 
triggering old-fashioned investor panics and creditor runs.
24
  
Markets for trading such instruments are themselves increasingly 
complex, with many different market participants connected through an 
intricate network of direct contractual links and indirect common exposure 
to risks.
25
 Complex structured transactions effectively separate and 
repackage ownership, payment, and other rights associated with the 
reference assets.
26
 This, in turn, reduces transparency and flexibility in 
these markets, leading to greater systemic risk and instability.
27
 As a result 
of this complexity, opacity, interconnectedness, and fragmentation, 
individual financial institutions lack the ability to measure and analyze not 
only the overall pattern of risk distribution in the financial system, but also 
the true level of their own risk exposure.
28
 Importantly, they can also 
purposely obscure risk from regulators‘ view. Thus, complexity remains 
―the greatest financial-market challenge of the future.‖29 
 
 
Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 807 
(2010). 
 23. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 221–29. 
 24. See, e.g., Gorton, supra note 3; DARRELL DUFFIE, HOW BIG BANKS FAIL AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT (2011).  
 25. See GROUP OF THIRTY, ENHANCING FINANCIAL STABILITY AND RESILIENCE: 
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY, TOOLS, AND SYSTEMS FOR THE FUTURE 22–23 (2010), available at 
http://www.group30.org/images/PDF/Macroprudential_Report_Final.pdf; Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 
233–35. 
 26. See Judge, supra note 12; David A. Dana, The Foreclosure Crisis and the Antifragmentation 
Principle of State Property Law, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 97 (2010) (arguing that the complex, multi-
layered structure of mortgage securitization created excessive fragmentation of property interests, 
which caused the mortgage crisis and impedes its resolution). The argument that excessive complexity 
of financial products may violate some of the basic principles of state property law, including the rule 
against unreasonable restraints on alienation of property interests, provides a potentially powerful 
alternative basis for advocating ex ante regulatory controls on product development. I owe this insight 
to Professor Heather Hughes. 
 27. See Judge, supra note 12. 
 28. See Awrey, supra note 4; Utset, supra note 4; Judge, supra note 12. 
 29. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 213. Some may argue that the role of complexity in bringing 
about the latest financial crisis is exaggerated and that the regulators understood the problems and had 
the proper tools to remedy them but chose not to take the necessary action. This is a valid argument, 
especially with respect to federal bank regulators‘ refusal to stop abusive mortgage lending practices 
or the SEC‘s failure to police instances of improper disclosure or conflict of interest. However, it tends 
to understate the significance of regulatory and jurisdictional gaps created by the emergence of 
complex financial instruments. For example, no federal regulatory agency had direct authority to 
regulate OTC derivatives markets. Moreover, systemic risk is often not connected to fraud or other 
illegal conduct. This argument also misses the crucial link between the explosive growth of risk in 
―simple‖ asset categories (such as mortgage loans) and the demand for such risk from institutions that 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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It is important to emphasize that both complexity and financial 
innovation are normatively neutral concepts. Complex and innovative 
financial instruments, activities, and interrelationships are neither 
inherently harmful nor invariably beneficial. They make the financial 
system less stable and more prone to shocks, but also enable it to develop 
and adjust to new circumstances. The prevailing economic theory tends to 
over-emphasize the positive role of financial innovation as ―a rational 
demand-driven response to market imperfections.‖30 That explanation, 
however, ignores what Dan Awrey calls ―supply-side incentives‖ of 
financial intermediaries—dealers and market-makers—to continue 
creating complex financial products, not in response to natural market 
demand, but in order to generate short-term, monopoly-like rents.
31
  
The typical narrative of various market participants‘ interactions as 
―buyers‖ and ―sellers‖ in an individual transaction often obscures the 
central role of dealers in generating complexity and systemic risk. Dealers 
are essential players in the markets for derivatives and structured products: 
they design complex instruments offering various combinations of 
financial risk and return, and market them to clients by taking either side 
of the transaction.
32
 Dealers build large portfolios of positions in various 
instruments and hedge their risks by entering into trades with other clients 
or, more commonly, other dealers. Thus, it is the dealer institutions that 
create, distribute, and maintain markets in financial risk, expand linkages 
among market participants, and multiply potential channels of contagion 
in the financial system. 
Financial intermediaries do not typically enjoy legal monopoly rights—
through patent protection or otherwise—on their innovative products, 
which can be reverse-engineered and reproduced by their competitors. 
Dealers derive the highest profits from being the first to design and sell a 
new financial instrument that is perceived as offering some unique 
benefits to investors, mostly by enhancing their ability to engage in 
speculation and arbitrage, and therefore commands a high premium. Once 
a new product becomes commoditized, the original dealer loses its ability 
to extract monopolistic rents and seeks to introduce the next innovation to 
 
 
structured and invested in complex financial instruments referencing such assets. See THE LEVIN 
REPORT, supra note 11, at 17–25. 
 30. Awrey, supra note 4, at 30. 
 31. Id. at 32–37. Highlighting the intimate link between financial innovation and complexity, 
Awrey notes, ―It is in their quest to maximize and exploit their superior tolerance for complexity that 
financial intermediaries have driven us toward—and perhaps even beyond—the complexity frontier.‖ 
Id. at 39. 
 32. Id.  
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recapture lost rents.
33
 Modern technology enables financial institutions to 
artificially accelerate the pace of this ―socially useless‖ over-innovation.34  
A direct result of this strategy is constant introduction of new complex 
financial instruments into the market, even in the absence of any ―natural‖ 
demand for such instruments—a phenomenon best described as strategic 
complexity.
35
 According to one influential study, 
[I]t seems likely that some and perhaps much of the structuring and 
trading activity involved in the complex version of securitized 
credit, was not required to deliver credit intermediation efficiently. 
Instead, it achieved an economic rent extraction made possible by 
the opacity of margins, the asymmetry of information and 
knowledge between end users of financial services and producers, 
and the structure of the principal/agent relationships between 
investors and companies and between companies and individual 
employees.
36
  
Understanding these dynamics is the key to developing an informed 
and pragmatic normative basis for managing complexity in the financial 
system. Whether the increasing complexity of financial products and 
activities is beneficial to society depends ultimately on what they are used 
for and how they affect—intentionally or unintentionally—not only 
individual firms and financial markets, but also broader social and 
economic policies and values. Similarly, an optimal or desirable level of 
innovation and complexity in financial markets is relative to society‘s 
capacity to manage and regulate risks associated with these phenomena. 
The key challenge, therefore, is to develop a mechanism for determining 
which innovative financial instruments and transactions offer economic 
 
 
 33. Id. at 34–35. As Awrey describes it, 
This strategy does not necessarily rely on the existence of any natural demand in the 
marketplace, nor on the innovation itself being ―new‖ in any material respect. Rather, it can 
theoretically be premised on little more than, inter alia, capitalizing on investor short-
termism, other behavioral factures, or simply tapping the innate human desire for the ―next 
new thing.‖ The practical effect of this strategy is to reset the diffusion clock—in essence 
creating more (albeit shorter) monopoly-like periods—thereby enabling intermediaries to 
extract greater rents from their innovations. 
Id. at 37–38 (footnotes omitted). 
 34. Id. at 38 (quoting Adair Turner, Chairman of the U.K. Financial Services Authority).  
 35. For an insightful analysis of this phenomenon in the mortgage finance market, see Adam J. 
Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO L.J. 1177 (2012) (arguing that 
the main ―supply-side‖ cause of the recent crisis was the growth of unregulated private securitization 
market in which financial institutions exploited complexity to misprice credit risk). 
 36. TURNER REVIEW, supra note 11, at 49. 
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and social benefits that outweigh potential increases in systemic risk and 
strategic complexity in financial markets.
37
  
The recent crisis underscored the reasons for not relying primarily on 
private actors in financial markets to make these types of measured and 
socially responsible determinations.
38
 It exposed the dangers of keeping 
naïve faith in the ―natural‖ alignment between private actors‘ rational self-
interest and the broader public interests in preserving systemic stability, 
especially in the context of today‘s complex and inherently unstable 
financial markets.
39
  
Several factors explain the inability of private financial institutions to 
effectively manage systemic risk associated with complexity. As 
influential behavioral finance studies show, various cognitive biases 
increase the chances of presumably rational actors making irrational 
choices.
40
 In an increasingly complex and uncertain environment, 
individuals and organizations tend to rely heavily on heuristic devices that 
produce sub-optimal results.
41
 Even setting aside the role of behavioral 
biases, the crisis experience demonstrated how the inherent logic of 
financial-market rationality, without corrective government intervention, 
leads to instability and systemic failure.
42
 Private profit-seeking enterprises 
 
 
 37. According to one study, 
The alternative [to current incremental approach to reforms] is to challenge, rather than take 
as inevitable, a complex, integrated, and securitized system of finance, and to consider 
possibilities for redesigning financial infrastructures themselves. If we take seriously the 
notion that regulation constitutes markets, rather than merely intervening in markets ―after the 
fact,‖ then the current moment becomes an opportunity to rethink market architecture, in light 
of the problems of complexity and tight coupling. 
Marc Schneiberg & Tim Bartley, Regulating or Redesigning Finance? Market Architectures, Normal 
Accidents, and Dilemmas of Regulatory Reform, RESEARCH IN SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS 281, 
283 (M. Lounsbury & P. Hirsh eds., 2010). 
 38. See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical 
Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME. L. REV. 1349 (2011). 
 39. One of the most revealing moments in this respect came in October 2008, when the former 
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the ―Federal Reserve‖), Alan 
Greenspan, publicly admitted that he had erred in putting too much faith in the self-correcting powers 
of free markets. See Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 23, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html. 
 40. Scholars in behavioral finance offer sophisticated theoretical accounts of such biases, or 
heuristic devices commonly used by market actors as short cuts for their decision-making. See, e.g., 
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1993); BEHAVIORAL LAW & 
ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: 
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
 41. See, e.g., Miller & Rosenfeld, supra note 22; Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased 
Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper‘s Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of Financial 
Risk-Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209 (2011).  
 42. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‗08 AND THE 
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009) (discussing the causes of the recent financial crisis and arguing that 
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rationally act in a self-regarding manner when assessing and taking risks. 
They do not internalize the spillover effects of such selfish risk-taking, 
which are particularly dangerous in the context of today‘s interconnected 
financial markets.
43
 As Professors Anabtawi and Schwarcz conclude, this 
―tragedy of the commons suggests that, absent intervention, financial 
market participants will progressively pursue their self-interest in the form 
of socially excessive risk-taking.‖44 Finally, the recent crisis provided 
numerous examples of private market participants intentionally acting 
with reckless disregard for potentially harmful effects of their conduct on 
their counterparties or the broader economy.
45
 The opacity and complexity 
of financial products amplified the ability of financial institutions to profit 
from this type of socially destructive behavior and, at the same time, made 
it more difficult to hold them legally accountable for it.
46
 
As private market participants lack the capacity and the incentives to 
solve the fundamental tension between private and public costs and 
benefits of financial innovation and increasing complexity, developing a 
mechanism for balancing these factors becomes a task primarily for 
lawmakers and regulators.  
B. Regulating Complexity  
How to regulate complexity that results from financial innovation is a 
vexing question, both in practice and in theory. The recent crisis was not 
only a systemic market failure, but also a systemic regulatory failure.
47
 In 
the wake of the crisis, policymakers and academics face the challenge of 
reassessing the pre-crisis regulatory philosophy and articulating a new set 
of principles for redefining the public-private balance in financial services 
regulation.  
 
 
rational profit-maximizing behavior of market actors produces negative externalities that cannot be 
controlled without government regulation); See also Utset, supra note 4. 
 43. See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 38, at 1374–76. 
 44. Id. at 1375. 
 45. For detailed case studies of such behavior, see THE LEVIN REPORT, supra note 11. See also 
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning A Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory 
Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2041–42 (2007) (arguing that securitization enabled predatory 
lending and growth of subprime mortgage markets).  
 46. See, e.g., THE LEVIN REPORT, supra note 11, at 318–636 (detailing the instances of abusive 
market conduct by Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs). 
 47. See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM‘N, supra note 11 (concluding that various federal 
regulatory agencies‘ failure to exercise proper oversight of financial institutions and markets was a 
major contributing factor behind the crisis). 
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1. From Greenspan to Dodd-Frank: Regulatory Responses to 
Complexity 
For decades before the recent financial crisis, the so-called ―Greenspan 
doctrine‖ was the dominant ideology underlying and guiding regulatory 
developments in the U.S. financial services sector.
48
 Driven by an 
unwavering faith in the supremacy and self-regulatory wisdom of free 
markets, the Greenspan doctrine held that all financial innovation was an 
unqualified public good, that complex financial instruments always 
transferred risk to those ―who were better able to bear it,‖ and that 
unregulated hedge funds and other speculators were indispensable and 
benign sources of liquidity in financial markets.
49
 Accordingly, under this 
ideological creed, the goal of regulation was, quite simply, to not interfere 
with the victorious march of financial innovation.
50
  
Regulatory agencies dealt with the growing informational asymmetry 
with respect to complex financial instruments by relying increasingly on 
the financial services industry‘s internal capacity to identify, measure, and 
control the risks arising out of its business activities. The concept of ―risk 
management‖ on an individual-entity level became the cornerstone of the 
regulatory approach used to accommodate the increasing complexity of 
financial products and the institutions that created and traded them.
51
 
Regulators viewed individual enterprise-wide risk management as the 
principal tool for maintaining system-wide financial stability.
52
 This 
approach essentially rejected the validity of imposing limits on private 
 
 
 48. This neoliberal ideological creed, as applied to financial services regulation, was named after 
Alan Greenspan, the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve and the ―Maestro‖ of financial markets, 
who was its most influential proponent. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 7, at 100–04 (describing 
Greenspan‘s beliefs and ideological influence). 
 49. See Cristie Ford, Macro and Micro Level Effects on Responsive Financial Regulation, 44 
U.B.C. L. REV. 589, 612 (2011) (―[T]he prevailing assumption in the years leading up to the financial 
crisis was that all innovation was by definition beneficial, because unsound ideas would be winnowed 
out by market forces.‖) 
 50. Id. 
 51. In the pre-crisis decade, the concept of Enterprise Risk Management (―ERM‖) dominated the 
discussions among industry experts, academics, and policy makers. See generally NEIL DOHERTY, 
INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT (2000); JAMES LAM, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT: FROM 
INCENTIVES TO CONTROL (2003); DAVID L. OLSON & DESHENG WU, NEW FRONTIERS IN ENTERPRISE 
RISK MANAGEMENT (2008). 
 52. One example of this approach is capital adequacy regulation, which ties financial institutions‘ 
leverage to the riskiness of their assets and is widely viewed as the cornerstone of prudential 
regulation. For a description of the international framework of capital adequacy regulation, see HAL S. 
SCOTT & ANNA GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 
412–73 (18th ed. 2011).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss1/2
  
 
 
 
 
2012] LICENSE TO DEAL 77 
 
 
 
 
actors‘ risk-taking, instead tying the levels of socially acceptable risk to 
financial market participants‘ ability to manage such risk internally.53 This 
approach, however, had two fundamental flaws. First, it significantly 
overestimated the ability and, more importantly, the incentives of financial 
institutions to manage risk, especially in the face of high uncertainty and 
potential profitability of risky activities.
54
 Second, it incorrectly assumed a 
direct link between firm-level risk management and system-wide 
stability.
55
  
The centerpiece of the post-crisis U.S. reform legislation, the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the 
―Dodd-Frank Act‖),56 explicitly focuses on systemic risk regulation. 
Despite the ambitious sweep of the envisioned reforms, however, the 
Dodd-Frank Act falls short of offering a new approach to regulating 
complexity. The new law seeks to control systemic risk primarily through 
an array of familiar measures, including restructuring and creating new 
regulatory agencies, mandating a significantly greater amount of 
information to be disclosed by market participants, enhancing capital 
requirements for certain institutions or activities, extending the 
jurisdictional reach of financial regulators to a wider universe of entities, 
and shoring up the market infrastructure. Whether the voluminous 
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act will ultimately have a significant 
practical impact depends greatly on their implementation by the regulatory 
agencies. It is clear, however, that the Dodd-Frank Act does not offer any 
direct solution to the fundamental dilemma of how to reduce and control 
complexity and interconnectedness in financial markets. 
The Dodd-Frank Act‘s provisions dealing with regulation of OTC 
derivatives illustrate this approach.
57
 The statute mandates, subject to some 
exceptions, central clearing of standardized derivatives through regulated 
clearing organizations and trading through either regulated exchanges or 
so-called swap execution facilities.
58
 It also introduces new regulatory 
 
 
 53. Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the ―Business of 
Banking‖, 63 MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1107 (2009). 
 54. See supra notes 38–46 and accompanying text. 
 55. See, e.g., Eric J. Pan, Understanding Financial Regulation 43 (Cardozo Legal Studies 
Working Paper No. 329, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=180 
5018 (―Regulators cannot expect that private actors will be capable of identifying how the actions of 
individual firms may make the financial system less stable.‖). 
 56. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2011)). 
 57. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 701–74 (West Supp. 2011).  
 58. 12 U.S.C.A.  § 723 (West Supp. 2011). 
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categories of financial actors: swap dealers and major swap participants.
59
 
The Securities Exchange Commission (―SEC‖) and the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (―CFTC‖) share oversight of OTC 
derivatives markets in a manner largely consistent with the historical 
jurisdictional divisions between these agencies.
60
 Market participants must 
report swap transactions to regulators and special data repositories, while 
the SEC and CFTC are required to adopt rules on real-time public data 
reporting of swap transactions.
61
 The new law also requires the regulators 
to develop business conduct rules for swap dealers and major swap 
participants, as well as special capital and margin rules for various types of 
swaps.
62
 The Act does not, however, directly aim to lower the level of risk 
or complexity present in the OTC derivatives market. While encouraging 
standardization of derivatives products, the law exempts individually 
tailored, or ―bespoke,‖ instruments—which are most likely to be highly 
complex and risky—from the mandatory exchange trading and central 
clearing.
63
 Ultimately, the statute fails to articulate a fundamental principle 
for balancing the benefits of increasingly complex derivatives transactions 
and markets against their potential risks to long-term financial and 
economic stability.
64
  
2. From Economic to Risk Regulation: Potential Alternatives in the 
Academic Debate 
The recent crisis underscored the lack of a conceptual framework for 
regulating complexity and systemic risk in the financial services sector 
and reignited scholarly debate on the proper scope and objectives of 
financial regulation reform. 
 
 
 59. 12 U.S.C.A.  § 731 (West Supp. 2011). 
 60. See DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, LLP, SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET 
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, ENACTED INTO LAW ON JULY 21, 2010, at 52 (2010), 
available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/7084f9fe-6580-413b-b870-b7c025ed2ecf/ 
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1d4495c7-0be0-4e9a-ba77-f786fb90464a/070910_Financial_Reform 
_Summary.pdf.  
 61. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 727–30 (West Supp. 2011).  
 62. 12 U.S.C.A. § 719 (West Supp. 2011). 
 63. 12 U.S.C.A. § 763 (West Supp. 2011). In a somewhat confusing manner, the Dodd-Frank Act 
contains provisions authorizing some form of pre-market review of securities futures and ―novel 
derivative products.‖ 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 717–18 (West Supp. 2011). These provisions, however, establish 
the process for clarifying the jurisdictional lines between SEC and CFTC with respect to products that 
combine elements of securities and commodity futures. Although it is not clear how these provisions 
will be implemented in practice, the language of the Act itself does not mandate substantive pre-
approval of complex derivatives. 
 64. See Saule T. Omarova, The Dodd-Frank Act: A New Deal for A New Age?, 15 N.C. BANKING 
INST. 83 (2011). 
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Broadly, there are three interrelated approaches to theorizing 
regulation.
65
 The first approach focuses on the rationale and the goals of 
regulation (normative theories of regulation); the second approach focuses 
on the process and efficacy of regulation (theories of regulatory design);
66
 
and the third approach focuses on the origins and political basis of 
regulatory choices (theories of political economy of regulation).
67
 From a 
normative perspective, it is possible to draw broad distinctions among 
three types of regulation:
68
 (1) economic regulation aimed primarily at 
correcting specific market inefficiencies in order to enable the frictionless 
operation of free market forces;
69
 (2) social regulation that seeks to 
allocate economic and political rights in accordance with broader societal 
values and norms;
70
 and (3) risk regulation seeking to protect society from 
significant and potentially catastrophic risks.
71
 While, in reality, these 
three types of regulation operate along a continuum,
72
 the relative salience 
of normative claims along that continuum often signifies a fundamental 
shift in the nature of the regulatory regime.
73
 
 
 
 65. Elsewhere, these three approaches were referred to as the Public Interest, Public 
Administration, and Public Choice perspectives, respectively. See JEFFREY L. HARRISON ET AL., 
REGULATION AND DEREGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 19–39 (2d ed. 2004).  
 66. For a classic example of this approach, see IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE 
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992). 
 67. Various versions of the public choice analysis fall in this category. See George J. Stigler, The 
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971); BARRY M. MITNICK, THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: CREATING, DESIGNING, AND REMOVING REGULATORY FORMS 
(1980); ROGER G. NOLL & BRUCE M. OWEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEREGULATION: INTEREST 
GROUPS IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS (1983); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND 
PUBLIC CHOICE (1991). 
 68. These three categories are not mutually exclusive. In reality, many forms of regulation pursue 
complex policy objectives and have significant implications in all three areas. This grouping is meant 
as an analytical roadmap for situating the proposal advanced in this Article in the broader academic 
debate on financial regulation reform. 
 69. For a classic analysis of economic regulation, see STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS 
REFORM (1982). 
 70. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1997). 
 71. This category includes, most notably, environmental, health, and safety regulation. See Julia 
Black, The Role of Risk in Regulatory Processes, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 302, 
305–06 (Robert Baldwin et al. eds., 2010).  
 72. In some fundamental sense, all regulation aims to control some form of risk. For a thorough 
and nuanced discussion of the role of risk in regulation, see Black, supra note 71. 
 73. According to Julia Black,  
[N]ot all regulation is described as being about ―risk‖. The regulators of water, rail, 
telecommunications, competition, and energy are typically referred to by policy makers and 
academics not as ―risk‖ regulators but as ―economic‖ regulators. These economic regulators 
are the archetypal ―regulatory state‖ regulators . . . , established to regulate liberalised markets 
in the 1980s and 1990s across a wide range of countries. In accordance with the canons of 
economic liberalism, the object of regulation for those regulators is defined in terms of the 
market, and regulation is justified principally in terms of its role in correcting market failures: 
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Before the latest crisis, financial services regulation was generally 
viewed as just another case of economic regulation whose primary goal 
was to correct market inefficiencies (such as informational asymmetries, 
monopolistic tendencies, or agency problems), minimize the possibility of 
market failure (such as infamous bank runs), but otherwise to not impose 
excessive costs on, or interfere with the proper functioning of, private 
financial markets.
74
 Disclosure requirements of federal securities laws, 
federal deposit insurance and access to the lender of last resort for 
depository institutions, conflict-of-interest rules for financial 
intermediaries, and prudential regulation of banking institutions are 
examples of such corrective regulatory mechanisms targeting specific 
problems in the operation of free market forces.
75
  
The crisis of 2007–09, however, exposed the growing saliency of 
policy objectives associated with the risk-regulation model. While 
correcting specific market inefficiencies and allowing free-market 
mechanisms to work remains an important regulatory goal, it is now clear 
that government regulation has to protect the national (and, ultimately, 
global) economy and citizenry from potentially catastrophic consequences 
of financial market failure. Prioritizing systemic financial and economic 
stability over market participants‘ freedom to pursue private gain makes 
financial services regulation more fundamentally similar to regulatory 
systems aimed at protection of human health, safety, and environment. 
The post-crisis pragmatic imperative, thus, necessitates a shift in the 
underlying paradigm of financial services regulation.  
To date, however, such a shift has not been fully conceptualized, as the 
academic community struggles to reconcile the new post-crisis emphasis 
on risk regulation with the powerful traditional focus on pure market 
efficiency. The pre-crisis normative assumptions regarding the limits of 
government intervention in financial markets continue to shape the 
 
 
monopolies, barriers to entry or exit, externalities, information asymmetries, or principal-
agent problems. 
Id. at 305 (internal citations omitted). 
 74. See TURNER REVIEW, supra note 11, at 39 (―The predominant assumption behind financial 
market regulation—in the US, the UK and increasingly around the world—has been that financial 
markets are capable of being both efficient and rational and that a key goal of financial market 
regulation is to remove the impediments which might produce inefficient and illiquid markets.‖) 
 75. U.S. banking law has strong elements of risk regulation, insofar as it seeks to prevent 
systemic effects of bank failure and to safeguard the federal deposit insurance fund. Nevertheless, the 
U.S. system of bank regulation and supervision focuses primarily on protecting the safety and 
soundness of individual deposit-taking institutions by addressing their inherent vulnerability to runs. In 
that sense, it remains essentially a form of economic regulation. 
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ongoing debate on how to make those markets less dangerous not only to 
market participants, but also to citizenry at large. 
The majority of current reform proposals continue to rely primarily on 
market-based solutions to the problem of systemic risk caused by 
increasing complexity of financial products and markets. These solutions 
generally aim at creating incentives for individual firms, their agents, and 
various gatekeepers to act in a more informed, rational, and efficient way, 
which is expected to reduce the risk to both the individual firms‘ own 
financial health and the financial system as a whole. In effect, they pursue 
the familiar objective of eliminating specific inefficiencies that distort 
market dynamics. Examples of such proposed measures include enhanced 
disclosure of financial and transactional data,
76
 strengthened corporate 
governance and changes in executive compensation at financial firms,
77
 
heightened capital requirements,
78
 improving the quality and reliability of 
credit ratings,
79
 creation of contingent capital instruments,
80
 and even tying 
regulators‘ compensation to performance of regulated financial 
institutions.
81
 Scholars also focus on strengthening and improving the 
existing mechanisms of regulation and supervision in the financial services 
sector. Some of the proposed measures include tougher regulation of credit 
rating agencies‘ rating processes,82 extending regulatory oversight to non-
bank financial actors operating in the so-called shadow banking system,
83
 
 
 
 76. See, e.g., Howell E. Jackson, Loan-Level Disclosure in Securitization Transactions: A 
Problem with Three Dimensions (Harv. Law School Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, 
Paper No. 10-40, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1649657 
(arguing for mandating public disclosure of loan-level information in securitizations). 
 77. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers‘ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247 
(2010); Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk 
Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1205 (2010). 
 78. See, e.g., Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System, 
33 HARVARD J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 671 (2010). 
 79. See, e.g., John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the ―Worldwide Credit Crisis‖: The 
Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and the Proposal for Improvement, 2009 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 109 (2009); Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee 
Approach for Rating Agency Accountability, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1011 (2009).  
 80. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the 
Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (2011). 
 81. Frederick Tung & M. Todd Henderson, Pay for Regulator Performance (U. Chi. L. & Econ., 
Olin Working Paper No. 574, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1916310.  
 82. See, e.g., Hunt, supra note 79; Manns, supra note 79; Frank Partnoy, Rethinking Regulation 
of Credit Rating Agencies: An Institutional Investor Perspective 3 (2009), available at http://www.cii 
.org/userfiles/file/CRAWhitepaper04-14-09.pdf.  
 83. See, e.g., Morgan Ricks, A Regulatory Design for Monetary Stability (Harv. John M. Olin 
Ctr. for L. Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 706, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1933890.  
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and eliminating the preferential treatment of derivatives contracts under 
federal bankruptcy laws.
84
 Finally, a few proposals offer more radical 
structural solutions, such as breaking up financial institutions that are ―too 
big to fail.‖85  
While these proposals contain valuable insights into important issues in 
financial regulation reform, they generally offer only partial solutions to 
the problem of systemic risk control. Discrete reform measures are likely 
to work only if they are part of a broader strategic process. More 
importantly, the tools and methods of traditional ―economic‖ regulation of 
financial services, such as disclosure or use of contingent capital 
instruments, are likely to do little to resolve the more fundamental 
problems posed by the increasing complexity and interconnectedness in 
the financial system.
86
 
A different strand in the academic debate shifts focus to the process of 
regulation itself. Building on basic insights from behavioral finance,
87
 
New Governance theories,
88
 and the concept of responsive regulation,
89
 
scholars engaged in this conversation on regulatory design generally 
advocate a more self-reflexive, dialogic, iterative regulatory process that is 
better able to adapt to the complex and dynamic reality of financial 
markets.
90
 This approach rejects unquestioning reliance on market 
mechanisms, but at the same time is skeptical of static ―command-and-
control‖ solutions to the problem of systemic risk prevention. Despite the 
differences in their methodological and normative arguments, these 
scholars explicitly acknowledge complexity as the central challenge for 
 
 
 84. See Roe, supra note 13. 
 85. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An Ersatz-
Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368 (2011); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra 
note 7. 
 86. See supra Part I.A. The crisis clearly exposed the limits of mandatory disclosure as the 
remedy for market inefficiencies caused by excessive complexity of financial products and structures. 
See Levitin & Wachter, supra note 35 (discussing the pernicious effects of informational opacity in 
complex securitizations). The risk-regulation paradigm acknowledges the limits of disclosure even 
more explicitly. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 70, at 338 (―Information may be an inadequate 
strategy when greater safety is a public good.‖). 
 87. See supra note 40.  
 88. For an overview of the New Governance theories, see Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall 
of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 
(2004). See also Scott Burris et al., Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current 
Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2008); Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and 
Principles-Based Securities Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 27–28 (2008).  
 89. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 66, at ch. 3. 
 90. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 49 (advocating a shift toward ―meta-regulation‖ as a more iterative 
and reflexive regulatory model that focuses regulators‘ attention on the unknown). 
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effective regulation and search for regulatory design solutions to that 
challenge.
91
 
This promising line of research highlights a critically important set of 
issues in regulatory reform. It is hard to deny that effective regulation of 
complex financial markets is itself a complex undertaking. Designing and 
implementing a dynamic and self-reflexive regulatory system is likely to 
be a long, difficult, and politically complicated process. In the meantime, 
however, it is necessary to address the increasing incongruity between 
financial services markets and financial services regulation. It stands to 
reason that until we are able to establish a sufficiently sophisticated and 
adaptive regulatory system, the only practical solution to this dilemma is 
trying to control, and even reduce, the level of complexity in the financial 
markets.  
Reconceptualizing financial services regulation as a form of risk 
regulation rather than purely economic regulation broadens our normative 
perspective and expands the range of potential methods of decision-
making. Thus, one of the central themes in risk regulation is how to 
operationalize precaution in making regulatory choices. One method of 
expressing this broad norm of precaution is the so-called precautionary 
principle that ―emphasize[s] anticipation of harm and taking preventive 
measures in the face of uncertainty. . . .‖92 Various formulations of the 
precautionary principle differ in the degree of presumptive risk-aversion.
93
 
Generally, the strong version of the principle (1) creates a presumption 
that regulatory action is necessary whenever a private activity potentially 
poses serious risks to important public interests, even in the absence of 
scientific certainty with respect to the nature or extent of such risks; and 
(2) explicitly places the burden on the private proponent of the risk-
creating activity to overcome the default by proving that risks are 
acceptable or reasonable.
94
  
The implementation of the precautionary principle involves highly 
politicized and contestable policy choices.
95
 Not surprisingly, the 
 
 
 91. See, e.g., Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 
1629 (2011); Miller & Rosenfeld, supra note 22.  
 92. Noah Sachs, Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle From its Critics, 2011 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1285, 1295 (2011). 
 93. See id. at 1292–95 (distinguishing between the weak and strong forms of the principle); 
Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution in a Multirisk World, in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK 
ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1509, 1513–18 (Dennis T. Paustenbach ed., 2002) (discussing 
three versions of the precautionary principle). 
 94. Sachs, supra note 92, at 1295. 
 95. See Black, supra note 72, at 319–21. 
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precautionary principle is a controversial matter and its practical efficacy 
is a subject of continuing debate and criticism.
96
 It is not the goal of this 
Article to advocate direct application of any particular formulation of 
precautionary principle to financial services regulation. Nevertheless, 
adopting and operationalizing the general concept of precaution in the 
context of post-crisis financial systemic risk regulation may be a 
worthwhile, and even necessary, exercise. 
C. The Concept of Product Approval Regulation 
This Article argues that one potentially effective method of 
operationalizing the concept of precaution in financial services regulation 
is to introduce a system of mandatory government licensing of complex 
financial products. Requiring regulatory pre-approval of financial products 
can function as a gatekeeping mechanism designed to discourage and 
reduce socially unproductive strategic complexity of financial instruments 
and markets and impose dynamic controls on the process of financial 
innovation. This regime would explicitly adopt an anticipatory approach to 
managing systemic risk and shift the burden of meeting the standards for 
approval to the financial institutions. By reducing the complexity and 
systemic vulnerabilities it creates, this model is likely to enhance the 
efficiency and integrity of financial markets. Thus, if successful, a system 
of mandatory pre-approval of complex financial products could serve as a 
hybrid regulatory model based on pragmatic considerations of precaution 
and efficiency. 
Professors Daniel Carpenter and Michael Ting define ―approval 
regulation‖ as a regime in which ―government entities exercise discretion 
over whether the firm or product can enter the market, such that firms 
must make an empirical case for admission that the regulator must accept 
if legal market entry is to be granted.‖97 Two key elements—regulatory 
discretion with respect to granting approval and a built-in ―proof‖ 
requirement
98—distinguish this form of regulation from Breyer‘s classic 
definition of ―regulation of entry‖ that typically sets forth purely 
 
 
 96. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (2003); THE REALITY 
OF PRECAUTION: COMPARING RISK REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (Jonathan B. 
Wiener et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter THE REALITY OF PRECAUTION].  
 97. Daniel Carpenter & Michael M. Ting, A Theory of Approval Regulation 2 (Feb. 10, 2004) 
(manuscript). 
 98. Id. at 2 n.1. 
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procedural conditions on market entry, such as licensing fees.
99
 In the 
approval regulation system, ―the state acts as a discretionary market 
gatekeeper and potential entrants provide not a fee but a proof of quality or 
necessity.‖100 
The idea of extending approval regulation to financial products became 
a subject of academic discussion in 2008–09, in the context of the debate 
on the creation of a new financial consumer protection agency. In 2008, 
Professors Elizabeth Warren and Oren Bar-Gill published a proposal to 
create a Financial Product Safety Commission (―FPSC‖) with a broad 
mandate to ensure that financial products sold to consumers meet certain 
safety standards, in a manner similar to the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission‘s monitoring of safety of tangible consumer products.101 In 
many respects, Warren and Bar-Gill‘s proposal was similar to the familiar 
model of a ―market conduct regulator‖ proposed earlier by the Treasury 
Department.
102
 By framing the issue as one of safety of financial products 
for consumers, however, their proposal effectively shifted the debate into 
the realm of risk regulation and democratic politics, as opposed to purely 
technocratic solutions to market inefficiencies. 
Other scholars elaborated on the FPSC concept and advanced their own 
versions of what the commission could and should do.
103
 Professor 
Carpenter proposed a model of an FPSC with broad ex ante approval 
power over consumer financial products, similar to the FDA.
104
 Under his 
proposal, the commission would have a ―veto power over market entry‖ 
for consumer financial products, based on the ―experimental or quasi-
experimental evidence‖ of the products‘ safety, quality, and efficacy.105 
Such evidence, for example, could come from the observable results of a 
 
 
 99. See BREYER, supra note 69. 
 100. Carpenter & Ting, supra note 97, at 2. 
 101. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
 102. See U.S. DEP‘T OF THE TREAS., BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY 
STRUCTURE (2008); U.S. DEP‘T OF THE TREAS., FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009), available at http:// 
www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf. 
 103. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007/2008 AND ITS MACROECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES 29–30 (2009), available at http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/download/ 
papers/2008_Financial_Crisis.pdf; Daniel Carpenter, Particulars of a Financial Product Safety 
Commission, in THE TOBIN PROJECT, CONSIDERING A FINANCIAL PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION 8 
(May 2009).  
 104. Carpenter, supra note 103, at 9–10.  
 105. Id. at 9. Professor Stiglitz emphasized that the FPSC had to ensure that all financial products 
had a bona fide risk management purpose and were proven to achieve that stated objective. Stiglitz, 
supra note 103, at 29. 
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limited product roll-out or modeling and simulations.
106
 According to 
Carpenter, information generated as a result of pre-approval 
experimentation would improve consumers‘ ability to make an informed 
choice and increase consumer confidence in the financial markets. This in 
turn would strengthen the demand for financial products deemed to be safe 
for consumers.
107
 By standardizing and collecting such information, the 
proposed FPSC would, in effect, improve market efficiency.
108
 
Later, Carpenter proposed a modified version of the financial product 
approval process, based on the file-and-use system similar to that adopted 
in the insurance industry.
109
 Under that model, every originator would be 
required to file a notice of intent with the FPSC to introduce a new 
―safety-regulated retail financial product,‖ including mortgages, payday 
loans, and credit cards.
110
 The filing would include a marketing plan and a 
mandatory schedule for experimental data collection. The FPSC would 
have 180 days to review the notice and stop the roll-out of the product if it 
found evidence that the product posed potential danger to consumers. If 
the commission failed to act within that period, the originator would be 
free to distribute the product. To ensure the reliability and fairness of the 
process, Carpenter emphasized the importance of public scrutiny of the 
products. He proposed appointing an advisory committee consisting of 
academics and stakeholder representatives, and ensuring public 
availability of the experimentation data and other pertinent product 
information. These procedural features of the model were meant to 
enhance the essential confidence-building function of the consumer 
financial product approval scheme.
111
 
In 2009, several bills proposing the creation of the FPSC were 
introduced in both the Senate and the House. After an intense political 
struggle, the Dodd-Frank Act created the Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection (―CFPB‖) within the Federal Reserve, charged with exercising 
consistent and unified oversight of the implementation of federal financial 
consumer protection laws.
112
 The CFPB, however, does not have explicit 
 
 
 106. Carpenter, supra note 103, at 9.  
 107. Daniel Carpenter et al., Approval Regulation and the Endogenous Provision of Confidence: 
Theory and an Analogy between Financial and Safety Regulation (Oct.26, 2009) (manuscript).  
 108. See Daniel Carpenter et al., Proposal for a Financial Product Approval Process with Modified 
File-and-Use Elements, Public Scrutiny, and Commitment Experimentation (June 10, 2009) 
(manuscript).  
 109. Id. at 1.  
 110. Id. at 4.  
 111. Id. at 2.  
 112. The Dodd-Frank Act, Title X, Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 11-
203, 124 Stat. 1955 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). 
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authority to review and approve any consumer financial product before it 
enters the market. Thus, despite the undeniable influence of the FPSC 
debate on the legislative process, the Dodd-Frank Act did not create a 
system of approval regulation with respect to consumer financial 
products.
113
  
The debate on the FPSC focused primarily on consumer financial 
services and framed the key issues in terms of consumer protection. 
Professors Eric Posner and Glen Weyl recently proposed what they called 
an ―FDA for Financial Innovation‖ approach aimed specifically at limiting 
speculation in derivatives.
114
 Under their proposal, a government agency 
would have to approve all new financial products—most clearly, 
derivatives—for marketing and trading only if such products pass a ―social 
utility‖ test that ―focuses on whether the product will likely be used more 
often for hedging than for speculation.‖115 Posner and Weyl argue that 
their approach would revive the common-law doctrine of insurable 
interest, which helped to limit financial speculation before the 
deregulatory changes in the 1990s unleashed its dangerous potential.
116
 
Although their proposal shifts the focus to product approval as a form of 
systemic risk regulation, it identifies and targets one specific source of 
systemic risk in financial markets—―the welfare-reducing effects of 
speculation on the speculators themselves.‖117 In effect, their article offers 
a traditional economic argument for introducing a speculation-curbing 
product approval scheme, but does not address specific details of 
regulatory design.
118
 
According to Posner and Weyl, financial products are fundamentally 
similar to pharmaceutical drugs and, therefore, should be subject to 
similarly rigorous controls.
119
 First, a full evaluation of the risks and 
benefits of financial products generally requires professional expertise that 
 
 
 113. Interestingly, the U.K. financial regulators appear to be moving toward instituting a product 
approval regime as a more effective and deliberately interventionist form of consumer protection. 
Thus, in early 2011, the UK FSA published a discussion paper proposing targeted reviews of specific 
financial instruments used by retail customers—including deposits, insurance policies, mortgages, and 
investment products—at an early stage of product design and marketing. See UNITED KINGDOM‘S FIN. 
SERV. AUTHORITY, DISCUSSION PAPER: PRODUCT INTERVENTION, DP 11/1 (Jan. 2011), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp11_01.pdf. 
 114. See Posner & Weyl, supra note 9.  
 115. Id. at 2. Posner and Weyl discuss additional factors that regulators would have to consider, 
but only if the quantitative market demand analysis does not produce an unambiguous answer. Id. at 
15–17. 
 116. Id. at 5.  
 117. Id. at 6.  
 118. See id. at 35.  
 119. Id. at 36–38. 
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most investors and consumers do not possess. Relying on non-
professionals‘ subjective preferences is not likely to produce optimal 
results.
120
 Second, financial decisions tend to have delayed and uncertain 
feedback, which reduces individuals‘ ability to correct their mistakes 
promptly.
121
 Finally, as the latest crisis demonstrated, the extent of 
potential harm that financial market failure may cause not only to 
individuals, but to society as a whole necessitates a more intrusive ex ante 
approach to financial regulation.
122
 
To this list, one can add the importance of public perceptions—not 
only of the extent of potential systemic risk in financial markets, but also 
of the nonconsensual nature and highly asymmetrical distributional effects 
of such risk.
123
 To gain legitimacy, regulatory choices must reflect public 
perceptions of how strictly a particular risky activity should be 
regulated.
124
 In the wake of the latest crisis, the general public is weary 
and disappointed in the integrity of financial markets and regulation. There 
is a widespread sense of dissatisfaction with a system that allows Wall 
Street insiders to reap exorbitant private profits from risky speculative 
activities, while the equally exorbitant costs of their failure are borne by 
unsuspecting taxpayers. This public perception is an important factor that 
supports putting risky financial instruments in the same category of strictly 
regulated products as medical drugs and hazardous chemicals.  
 
 
 120. Id. at 36–37. 
 121. Id. at 37–38. 
 122. Id. at 38. 
 123. Scholars of regulation have observed that people evaluate the gravity of specific risks—and 
the need to regulate such risks—not merely on the basis of purely statistical or other scientific 
evidence but in the broader qualitative and relational context. As Cass Sunstein argues, citizens‘ 
judgments about risk depend on many factors, including: 
(1) the catastrophic nature of the risk; (2) whether the risk is uncontrollable; (3) whether the 
risk involves irretrievable or permanent losses; (4) the social conditions under which a 
particular risk is generated and managed, a point that connects to issues of consent, 
voluntariness, and democratic control; (5) how equitably distributed the danger is or how 
concentrated on identifiable, innocent, or traditionally disadvantaged victims, which ties to 
both notions of community and moral ideals; [and] (6) how well understood the risk process 
in question is . . . . 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 70, at 133. 
 124. This fundamental concern with democratic legitimacy must be carefully balanced against the 
potential danger of ―elevat[ing] mass prejudice to public policy.‖ Wiener, supra note 93, at 1512. In 
the wake of the recent financial crisis, however, the lack of popular support for the regulatory status 
quo and general dissatisfaction with the pace and direction of the current reform seem to present a far 
more serious problem than any realistic possibility of ultra-populist prejudice-based over-regulation of 
the financial services industry. 
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II. PRODUCT APPROVAL REGULATION IN PRACTICE: PHARMACEUTICAL 
DRUGS, CHEMICALS, AND COMMODITY FUTURES 
The best-known model of product approval regulation in the United 
States is the mandatory licensing of pharmaceutical drugs, biologics, and 
medical devices by the FDA. In many respects, it is a quintessential form 
of public safety regulation, an example of the precautionary approach in 
practice.
125
 Although the FDA‘s administration of the drug approval 
scheme is a target of continuing criticisms, it provides a valuable basis for 
thinking about potential transferability of its key features into financial 
services regulation. 
Another potentially relevant example is the European Union‘s 
Regulation on Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of 
Chemicals (―REACH‖).126 This regulation was adopted in 2006 in order to 
bring all existing chemical substances under a comprehensive regulatory 
regime that includes, among other things, pre-approval requirements for 
certain hazardous chemicals. The implementation of this ambitious E.U.-
wide program exemplifies the challenges of extending a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme to a large number of previously unregulated products.  
Both the FDA and the REACH program operate in areas that are 
substantively different from financial services regulation. It is not widely 
known that, until relatively recently, a similar system of market-entry 
control also existed in the U.S. financial sector. Thus, from 1974 to 2000, 
all exchange-traded commodity futures were subject to mandatory pre-
approval by the CFTC.
127
 Although that system was abandoned after the 
adoption of the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (the 
―CFMA‖),128 it is an important source of substantive and normative 
principles that can potentially guide a search for an effective system of 
licensing a broader range of complex financial products.
129
 
 
 
 125. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on Comparison and 
Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT‘L L. 207 (2003) (arguing that the FDA 
regulatory regime is one of the examples of the United States implementing precautionary principle).  
 126. For general information on REACH Regulation, see Regulations, ECHA, http://echa.europa 
.eu/web/guest/regulations (last visited May 11, 2012).  
 127. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(a)(12) (1999) (repealed 2000). 
 128. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, & 15 U.S.C.). 
 129. This Article does not discuss the effect of the Dodd-Frank Act on the commodity futures 
regulation, because the mandatory product approval regime was abolished in 2000, well before its 
enactment. See id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
90 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:63 
 
 
 
 
This Part examines these three models of product approval regulation 
and attempts to draw potential lessons for evaluating the idea of approval 
regulation with respect to complex financial products. The purpose of this 
discussion is not to provide a full appraisal of each regime‘s operation. Far 
more modestly, the goal is to identify some of the key features of these 
regulatory schemes in order to frame our inquiry into whether, and how, a 
similar scheme can operate in the financial services sector. 
A. The FDA Model: Focus on Public Safety 
The FDA, an agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, is responsible for protecting and promoting public health and 
assuring the safety of foods, dietary supplements, pharmaceutical drugs, 
medical devices, cosmetics, and many other products.
130
 The FDA is a 
complex organization comprising several specialized centers, offices, and 
laboratories, and its regulations affect a significant number of economic 
activities.
131
 The agency implements several federal statutes, including the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act of 1938 (―FDCA‖).132 The scope and 
intensity of the FDA‘s safety regulation differs depending on the risks and 
other peculiar characteristics of different categories of products.  
 
 
 130. For general information on the FDA‘s mission, organization, and operation, see What does 
FDA do?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm 
194877.htm (last visited May 11, 2012).  
 131. According to one commentator, 
The F.D.A. regulates more than $1 trillion worth of consumer goods, which amounts to about 
25 cents of every consumer dollar spent in this country. This includes $466 billion in food 
sales, $275 billion in drugs, $60 billion in cosmetics and $18 billion in vitamin supplements. 
The agency is responsible for monitoring a third of all imported goods, from eggplant to 
eyeliner, microwave ovens to monoclonal antibodies, slaughterhouses to cellphones. 
Gardiner Harris, The Safety Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2008, at B44.  
 132. 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (2006). Adopted in response to the deaths caused by the solvent-
tainted antibiotic Elixir Sulfanilamide, the law initially operated more like a pre-market notification 
scheme. A formal product approval regime for new drugs was established in 1962, in response to a 
massive wave of severe birth defects associated with an anti-morning sickness drug, Thalidomide:  
This event fueled public pressure for more stringent regulation of the rapidly growing 
pharmaceutical industry. The 1962 Drug Amendments to the FDCA established a rigorous 
pre-market approval process that placed the burden of proof on drug manufacturers to 
demonstrate, under a substantial evidence standard, the safety and efficacy of their drug 
products. Equally remarkable, these sweeping reforms were passed unanimously by the 
House and Senate, despite substantial political opposition prior to the shock of the 
thalidomide debacle.  
David E. Adelman, New Directions in Environmental Law: A Cautiously Pessimistic Appraisal of 
Trends in Toxics Regulation, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 377, 403 (2010). 
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Pharmaceutical drugs are subject to the most intense regulatory 
oversight, including the mandatory pre-market licensing of new drugs.
133
 
The main purpose of the FDA‘s new drug approval process is to prevent 
potentially unsafe drugs from entering the market. In that sense, the FDA 
serves as a true gatekeeper agency guarding the entrance to the market 
and, in effect, controlling its composition. This regulatory scheme reflects 
an important normative principle that places individual humans‘ health 
and safety above the economic interests of private market participants. 
In administering its drug approval program, the FDA makes decisions 
that have significant medical and economic consequences. The FDA has a 
corps of in-house scientists conducting independent research necessary to 
support the agency decisions. Pharmaceutical companies present their own 
research and test data, which is often voluminous and complex. In addition 
to the strain on the agency‘s resources, the FDA‘s in-house review of this 
scientific evidence often faces a further challenge of coping with 
significant uncertainty. Thus, some have argued that the FDA‘s in-house 
research tends to be excessively conservative and prevents potentially 
valuable drugs from reaching the market.
134
 At the same time, given the 
irreversibility and potentially catastrophic nature of harm that an unsafe 
drug can cause, such conservatism may not be unwarranted.
135
  
From an institutional perspective, the FDA drug approval process 
involves a fundamental trade-off.
136
 On the one hand, the FDA faces a 
strong incentive to maintain its reputation as a safety regulator, which 
necessitates caution in accepting the industry‘s data and a more thorough 
probing of the scientific evidence.
137
 These reputational concerns at least 
partially explain why the FDA sets higher substantive standards for 
approving new drugs.
138
 The approval of an ―unsafe‖ drug typically has 
 
 
 133. Virtually every aspect of drug production and distribution, including research, testing, 
advertising, prescription, and safety, is subject to the FDA regulation. By contrast, foods and cosmetics 
are generally regulated only for labeling and safety. Medical devices and biological therapeutic agents, 
such as vaccines and blood or tissue products, are also subject to pre-market approval by the FDA. The 
discussion here focuses on new drug approval. 
 134. See Lars Noah, Scientific ―Republicanism‖: Expert Peer Review And the Quest for 
Regulatory Deliberation, 49 EMORY L.J. 1033, 1035–36 (2000).  
 135. This debate about the practical efficacy of the FDA‘s regulatory philosophy is tied to the 
academic debate on the virtues and limits of the precautionary principle as a default policy choice 
under conditions of uncertainty. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text. 
 136. Daniel P. Carpenter, The Political Economy of FDA Drug Review: Processing, Politics, And 
Lessons For Policy, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS 52, 53 (2004). 
 137. Id. Carpenter refers to this as ―the learning incentive.‖ 
 138. Carpenter argues that the FDA is strongly driven by concerns about maintaining its 
reputation as an effective safety regulator. Id. at 54; See also DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND 
POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT FDA (2010). 
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high visibility and may irreversibly damage the FDA‘s reputation.139 
On the other hand, however, the FDA operates under strong political 
pressure, as pharmaceutical firms lobby for faster approval of their 
products. The agency‘s decision to deny approval often has significant 
economic consequences for the pharmaceutical firm: 
The agency‘s drug review decisions are essentially final (contesting 
them is extremely difficult and costly) and immensely consequential 
(regulators in other nations frequently cue off of the FDA‘s 
decisions). If the FDA so chooses, it can materially impede the flow 
of new products to the pharmaceutical marketplace, or it can help 
accelerate that flow.
140
 
Pharmaceutical companies frequently criticize the FDA for being too 
rigid, conservative, and slow in granting drug approvals. From the start, 
the industry attacked the FDA drug approval regime as stifling innovation 
and blocking patient access to new drugs.
141
 Since the 1980s, 
pharmaceutical firms have also successfully mobilized, and often 
cultivated, patient-advocacy groups that had greater legitimacy as a public 
critic of the FDA‘s supposed failures to approve potentially beneficial 
drugs.
142
 This trend exacerbated the FDA‘s political dilemma and further 
complicated its decision-making process. 
One of the mechanisms the FDA employs to address the problem of 
scientific uncertainty and potential policy bias is the use of outside 
scientific peer-review of drug approval applications.
143
 Most of the FDA‘s 
advisory committees are established either by the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services or by the FDA Commissioner.
144
 The FDA typically 
solicits public nominations and applications for its scientific advisory 
committees. To be selected, the members must be technical experts in 
various areas, including ―clinical medicine, engineering, biological and 
 
 
 139. Carpenter, supra note 136, at 55. 
 140. Id. at 52–53.  
 141. See Adelman, supra note 132, at 404. 
 142. Carpenter, supra note 136, at 56. 
 143. The FDA currently uses fifty scientific expert committees and panels that provide 
independent expertise and advise the FDA on scientific issues of regulatory importance. See Advisory 
Committees, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/default.htm (last 
visited May 11, 2012).  
 144. PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 1576 (2007). Some of the FDA‘s 
scientific expert councils are statutorily established. These include the color additive advisory 
committees, 21 U.S.C. § 376(b)(5)(C)(D) (2006), and the advisory review panels for medical devices, 
21 U.S.C. § 360c(b) (2006). 
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physical sciences, biostatistics, and food sciences.‖145 In addition to 
proven substantive expertise, the members of the FDA‘s technical 
advisory committees must not have financial conflicts of interest.
146
  
The FDA‘s use of independent expert committees is typically justified 
as an important method of improving the quality of administrative 
decision-making under the condition of scientific uncertainty.
147
 Scientific 
advisory committees play the key role in the FDA‘s drug approval 
process. The FDA uses these institutions ―to legitimate the soundness of 
its analysis of a given product, as a public forum for discussion of 
controversial issues, and, on occasion, as an ‗appeals court‘ for disputed 
agency decisions.‖148 Thus, these committees serve not only a substantive, 
but also an important political function. The FDA‘s practice of using 
outside scientific committees for drug approval has also been 
controversial. The FDA‘s expert advisory committees have been criticized 
for not being truly independent from the FDA and for merely serving as a 
legitimizing device for the agency‘s decisions.149 There are also persistent 
suspicions that the FDA experts tend to favor the industry because of 
various hidden or indirect financial conflicts of interest.
150
 
Another important feature of the FDA drug approval process is post-
approval review, whereby the regulator allows a limited roll-out of the 
drug and requires the firm to collect and produce data on its safety and 
performance. This conditional approval process helps to generate valuable 
information on which to base the final decision about the potential benefits 
versus potential harms of a particular product. This information-generating 
potential of the FDA-type approval regulation strengthens markets by 
making them more predictable and safer for consumers.
151
 Some 
commentators, however, criticize the FDA‘s post-approval monitoring 
practices as insufficiently rigorous.
152
   
 
 
 145. Membership Types, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN,  http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/ 
AboutAdvisoryCommittees/CommitteeMembership/MembershipTypes/default.htm (last visited May 
11, 2012).  
 146. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 144, at 1588. 
 147. See Noah, supra note 134, at 1034. 
 148. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 146, at 1573.  
 149. See id. at 1060. 
 150. See, e.g., HUTT ET AL., supra note 146, at 1588.  
 151. See Carpenter et al., supra note 107, at 36.  
 152. See, e.g., Frances H. Miller, Medical Errors, New Drug Approval, and Patient Safety, in THE 
REALITY OF PRECAUTION 265, supra note 96 (―The efficacy of post-market surveillance leaves much 
to be desired in both the United States and the EU.‖). 
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B. Chemicals Regulation in the European Union: REACH  
Regulation of chemical substances aims at protecting human health and 
the environment from potentially catastrophic risks. The principle of 
exercising precaution, therefore, is of particular salience in this regulatory 
area.
153
  
In the U.S., the Environmental Protection Agency (―EPA‖) regulates 
chemicals under the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (―TSCA‖).154 
The TSCA established a system of pre-manufacturing notification and 
review by the EPA for all ―new‖ chemicals introduced into the market 
after the law was passed. Chemicals already in commerce as of that date 
were labeled ―existing‖ substances and were not subject to EPA review.155 
For ―new‖ chemical products, the TSCA does not require companies to 
submit hazard data to the EPA unless the EPA requests such data in the 
course of its 90-day pre-manufacturing review.
156
 Under the TSCA, the 
EPA must demonstrate that the chemical is dangerous enough to warrant 
testing and hazard data submission, which inhibits the agency‘s ability to 
demand pre-market risk assessments and forces it to rely on the voluntary 
submission of test data.
157
 As a result, the EPA lacks adequate scientific 
information on the toxicity of most chemicals.
158
 This allocation of the 
burden of proof under the TSCA creates incentives for chemical 
companies to maintain ―strategic ignorance‖ and avoid developing toxicity 
data on their products.
159
  
 
 
 153. See Ortwin Renn & E. Donald Elliott, Chemicals, in THE REALITY OF PRECAUTION, supra 
note 96, at 223, 224. 
 154. 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (2006). 
 155. See Felice Cooper & Rebecca Lawson, Environmental Liability: Chemicals Reform in the 
United States (17 May, 2010), available at http://www.allenovery.com/AOWEB/Knowledge/Editorial 
.aspx?contentTypeID=1&contentSubTypeID=7944&it.  
 156. Id. 
 157. 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (2006); See also Sachs, supra note 92; John S. Applegate, Synthesizing 
TSCA and REACH: Practical Principles for Chemical Regulation Reform, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721 
(2008). 
 158. See U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-428T, CHEMICAL REGULATION: 
OPTIONS FOR ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (2009), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/123792.pdf. As the report noted, 
As a result, EPA does not routinely assess the risks of the over 83,000 chemicals already in 
use. Moreover, TSCA does not require chemical companies to test the approximately 700 
new chemicals introduced into commerce each year for toxicity, and companies generally do 
not voluntarily perform such testing. 
Id. at 1. 
 159. See Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce 
Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1685 (2004); Sachs, supra 
note 92, at 1301. 
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Prior to 2006, the European Union had a similar system of chemicals 
regulation, which required pre-market notification and testing only for 
―new‖ chemicals introduced after 1981 but not for ―existing‖ chemicals as 
of that cut-off date. A total of 100,106 chemicals that were on the market 
as of 1981 were exempt from the regulatory requirements.
160
 Under that 
regime, companies had to test and notify the regulators of any ―new‖ 
chemicals in production volumes as low as ten kilograms per year, while 
they could manufacture and import any ―existing‖ chemicals without 
going through this expensive procedure.
161
 That policy created perverse 
incentives to continue using the untested ―existing‖ chemicals, and 
inhibited research and innovation.
162
 
In 1999, the European Commission (―EC‖) began working on a new 
regulatory framework, REACH, which, after years of negotiations, was 
formally adopted in December 2006.
163
 A new European Chemicals 
Agency (―ECHA‖) was formed to administer the new EU-wide regulatory 
regime.
164
 In contrast to the prior regulatory scheme, REACH brings all 
existing and new chemicals under a comprehensive system of registration, 
pre-market risk assessment, and mandatory pre-approval for certain 
dangerous substances.
165
 The new scheme is designed to produce an 
extensive body of data on all chemicals in the EU market.
166
  
REACH explicitly shifts the burden of testing chemicals for toxicity 
and ensuring their safety from the regulatory authorities to private industry 
actors.
167
 REACH ―is based on the principle that it is for manufacturers, 
importers and downstream users to ensure that they manufacture, place on 
the market or use such substances that do not adversely affect human 
health or the environment.‖168 Instead of mandating regulatory pre-
approval for all chemical substances, however, the program adopts a tiered 
 
 
 160. Renn & Elliott, supra note 153, at 236. Between 1981 and 2006, only about 3,000 ―new‖ 
chemicals were put on the EU market. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id.  
 163. See Commission Regulation 1907/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 396) 1 (EC) [hereinafter REACH], 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:396:0001:0849:EN :PDF. 
 164. For more information about the ECHA, see About Us, ECHA, http://echa.europa.eu/ 
web/guest/about-us;jsessionid=E54AD754F846A0D1507849D89B41DD09.live2 (last visited May 11, 
2012).  
 165. See REACH, EUROPEAN COMM‘N, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/chemicals/reach/ 
index_en.htm (last visited May 11, 2012).  
 166. See Sachs, supra note 92, at 1302 (―By rewarding knowledge and making chemical 
manufacturers responsible for data production, REACH is helping to end the data drought that has 
plagued European chemical regulation since the early 1980s.‖).  
 167. Renn & Elliott, supra note 153, at 237. 
 168. REACH, supra note 163, at 47. 
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approach that differentiates among categories of chemicals, depending on 
their quantity in commerce and toxic characteristics.
169
  
The quantity of a substance manufactured or used in the EU is the key 
factor in determining applicable testing requirements. Under REACH, 
only companies that produce or import more than one ton of any chemical 
substance per year must register that substance in a central database and 
submit to the ECHA extensive testing and risk data.
170
 Once the REACH 
registration requirement is triggered, the level of testing required varies, 
depending on whether a particular chemical is sold or produced in 
quantities above ten, one hundred, and one thousand metric tons 
annually.
171
 
In their submissions to the ECHA, manufacturers, importers or their 
customers must also identify the uses of each substance and, for chemicals 
produced or imported in volumes over ten tons per year, provide chemical 
safety reports.
172
 These reports pertain specifically to the identified uses of 
the chemical: they must contain an assessment of risks such uses pose to 
human health and the environment, and define the conditions of use under 
which those risks can be adequately controlled.
173
 
REACH further differentiates among categories of chemicals 
depending on their toxic characteristics, so that the most hazardous 
substances require the most extensive and rigorous testing and are subject 
to additional regulatory controls. Certain highly dangerous chemicals, 
which the ECHA designates as Substances of Very High Concern 
(―SVHC‖),174 are placed on the official Authorization List and cannot be 
 
 
 169. See Adelman, supra note 132, at 393 (―Classification based on quantities in commerce and 
chemical characteristics are defining features of REACH.‖). 
 170. Renn & Elliott, supra note 153, at 236. Registration dossiers include the data on the intrinsic 
properties and hazards of each substance, which may be established through testing, computer 
modeling, or epidemiologic studies. Id. at 238. The ECHA manages the central database containing 
collected data. 
 171. Adelman, supra note 132, at 393 (―For chemicals sold or manufactured in quantities of one to 
ten metric tons annually, testing should be limited to in vitro testing of acute hazards. The testing 
requirements are elevated to a standard base set of toxicology testing for chemicals sold or 
manufactured in quantities of ten to one hundred metric tons annually. Rigorous ‗substance-tailored 
testing for long-term effects‘ is required for quantities that exceed one thousand metric tons 
annually.‖) 
 172. See Information Requirements, ECHA, http://echa.europa.eu/web/guest/regulations/reach/ 
substance-registration/information-requirements (last visited May 11, 2012).  
 173. Id. 
 174. The SVHC group includes, for example, substances that are carcinogenic, mutagenic, and 
toxic to reproduction (―CMR‖) and other substances identified on a case-by-case basis, for which there 
is scientific evidence of probable serious effects that present similar concerns. See Authorisation, 
ECHA, http://echa.europa.eu/web/guest/regulations/reach/authorisation (last visited May 11, 2012).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss1/2
  
 
 
 
 
2012] LICENSE TO DEAL 97 
 
 
 
 
used or put on the market unless granted exemptions for specific uses.
175
 
Both the SVHC designation and the subsequent authorization process 
involve public consultations and detailed review of scientific data and 
opinions.
176
  
The purpose of this pre-market approval scheme is to control the use of 
hazardous chemicals and to encourage the industry to substitute such 
chemicals with less dangerous substances. Requests for authorization of 
specific SVHCs must be accompanied by a substitution plan and evidence 
that either the particular SVHC can be used safely or that the 
socioeconomic benefits of its use outweigh its risks.
177
 Public 
consultations are an important part of the process, which allows the 
industry and the broader public to submit comments and provide 
information on potential substitutes and alternative technologies.
178
 In 
addition, the ECHA has the authority to propose bans or restrictions on the 
manufacture, marketing or use of chemicals posing unacceptable risks to 
human health or the environment.
179
 
The program‘s official goal is to ―ensure a high level of protection of 
human health and the environment,‖ while also ―enhancing 
competitiveness and innovation.‖180 Implementation of this program, 
however, presents daunting challenges. Eliminating the distinction 
between ―new‖ and ―existing‖ chemicals under REACH means that the 
industry could potentially be required to test and register over 100,000 
previously untested chemical substances, all within a relatively short 
period of three to five years.
181
 The tiered regulatory approach helps to 
 
 
 175. Id.  
 176. For example, in early 2011, after more than two years of public consultations and studies, the 
ECHA put six chemicals on the Authorization List. See Authorisation List, ECHA, http://echa 
.europa.eu/web/guest/addressing-chemicals-of-concern/authorisation/recommendation-for-inclusion-in 
-the-authorisation-list/authorisation-list (last visited May 11, 2012).  
 177. REACH creates some flexibility by introducing two groups of CMRs for purposes of 
authorization: those with a ―safe threshold‖ of toxicity and those for which no threshold of ―safe use‖ 
can be established. For the first group, an authorization will be granted if the producer can show that 
the risks associated with the proposed use of such substances can be controlled effectively. For all 
other hazardous substances, an authorization will be granted only if there is no safer alternative and the 
socioeconomic benefits of their use significantly outweigh the risks. See Renn & Elliott, supra note 
153, at 240. 
 178. See Applications for Authorisation, ECHA, http://echa.europa.eu/web/guest/addressing-
chemicals-of-concern/authorisation/applications-for-authorisation (last visited May 11, 2012). 
 179. See Restriction, ECHA, http://echa.europa.eu/web/guest/addressing-chemicals-of-concern/ 
restriction (last visited May 11, 2012).  
 180. REACH, supra note 163, at 2. 
 181. The EC mandated that the process of testing, assessing, and registering all chemicals had to 
be completed by 2012, while the registration of very high-volume (above one thousand tons per year) 
and highly toxic or hazardous chemicals (such as CMR in volumes above one ton per year) had to be 
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limit the scope of this undertaking by targeting only those chemicals that, 
based on their volume and toxicity, create the highest potential human and 
environmental exposure to risk. In 2003, it was estimated that only about 
30,000 chemicals were produced or imported in quantities exceeding the 
new threshold for registration, although some of the later studies raised 
that estimate to about 68,000 chemicals.
182
 Only a small percentage of 
these substances are likely to be classified as SVHCs and require 
mandatory authorization.
183
 
Chemical companies objected to the adoption of REACH as imposing 
exorbitant costs on the industry, potentially stifling research and 
innovation, and creating a competitive disadvantage for the EU.
184
 The 
industry also argued that REACH would render manufacturing of certain 
lower-volume chemicals less profitable, which would limit market supply 
and may cause withdrawal of substances from the market, and have a 
disproportionally negative effect on economic viability of small and 
medium-sized chemical companies.
185
 The program‘s proponents, 
however, argued that its implementation costs were not excessively high in 
comparison to the industry‘s total revenues, and should be viewed as 
socially desirable internalization of externalities.
186
  
Still, the overall cost and administrative complexity of transitioning 
from the pre-2006 system to the REACH regime present a significant 
problem. In addition to monetary costs, the ECHA has to balance 
companies‘ concerns regarding disclosure of proprietary data against the 
need to ensure transparency and public access to information on hazardous 
substances. Another controversial issue relates to the increase in animal 
testing in order to produce the mandatory risk assessment data.
187
 Animal 
rights activists have been extremely critical of this controversial aspect of 
 
 
completed by 2010. Renn & Elliott, supra note 153, at 236.  
 182. See Renn & Elliott, supra note 153, at 239. In over thirty years before the enactment of 
REACH, government regulators required only seventy chemical risk assessments, which pales in 
comparison even to the lower estimate of 30,000 high-volume substances on the market. See Noah M. 
Sachs, Jumping the Pond: Transnational Law and the Future of Chemical Regulation, 62 VAND. L. 
REV. 1817, 1833–34 (2009). 
 183. See Adelman, supra note 132, at 394 (estimating that a total of about 1400 chemicals are 
likely to require authorization as SVHCs). 
 184. Calculating potential direct costs of REACH to the chemical industry has been a hotly 
debated issue, with estimates ranging from €2.3 billion to €5.2 billion. These estimates, however, may 
be too optimistic. Renn & Elliott, supra note 153, at 239. 
 185. Id. at 240. 
 186. Sachs, supra note 92, at 1333.  
 187. Renn & Elliott, supra note 153, at 239. According to some estimates, the mandatory testing 
of the existing chemicals may require fifty-four million research animals. Id. 
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REACH and lobbied to reduce the impact of tests on animals.
188
 
Introducing new testing technologies and more efficient methods of 
sharing existing experimental data, advocated by animal-rights groups, 
potentially reduces the rise in the number of research animals killed in the 
process.
189
 
As some scholars have observed, REACH is predominantly a data and 
information collection regime, which shifts the cost of producing such 
information to the private sector and empowers regulators to assess the 
tolerability of risk.
190
 It remains to be seen how effective REACH will be 
in achieving its proclaimed goals in practice.
191
 Nevertheless, the sheer 
magnitude of this E.U.-wide undertaking to build a regime for registering, 
tracing, and controlling the use of chemical substances demonstrates the 
feasibility of ambitious reforms that reflect an explicit political 
commitment to protect human health and environment. 
Similar to the FDA drug licensing scheme, REACH is based on the 
requirement for pre-market testing of regulated products. Conditioning 
market access on the pre-market experimental assessment of systemic risk 
posed by financial contracts, however, may not be feasible. It is difficult, 
if not impossible, to create a self-contained test market for a new financial 
instrument and to ensure that no risk will spill over into the broader 
financial system and cause irreversible damage to systemic stability. The 
centrality of experimental testing and pre-market empirical data collection 
to the product approval regulation of pharmaceutical drugs and chemicals 
potentially limits our ability to draw meaningful substantive lessons 
directly applicable to financial services regulation.  
At the same time, however, the requirement of empirical testing of 
individual products‘ safety may not be the only way to ensure a workable 
product licensing regime. A system of product pre-approval, which existed 
in the U.S. commodity futures sector before 2000, provides an example of 
a regime that was not based on mandatory pre-market testing of financial 
contracts. 
 
 
 188. See The Truth About REACH Animal Testing, EUROPEAN COALITION TO END ANIMAL 
EXPERIMENTS, http://www.eceae.org/de/what-we-do/campaigns/reach/the-truth-about-reach-animal-
testing (last visited May 11, 2012).  
 189. See id. 
 190. See Renn & Elliott, supra note 153, at 242. 
 191. See, e.g., Adelman, supra note 132, at 379–80 (arguing that agency discretion in 
implementing the regulation may mute the intended effects of procedural burden-shifting and that 
REACH ―opens the door to evasion through its tiered chemical classification scheme and the 
flexibility it affords manufacturers to use alternative testing methods.‖); Applegate, supra note 157, at 
724 (arguing that REACH was conceived as a Hegelian ―antithesis‖ to the TSCA and that the truly 
precautionary chemicals regulation has to offer a greater ―synthesis‖ of these two schemes). 
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C. Product Approval in Commodity Futures Regulation: Focus on Market 
Manipulation and Speculation  
1. Commodity Futures Regulation—Overview 
A futures contract is a form of derivative instrument.
192
 Commodity 
futures are standardized bilateral contracts that obligate one party (the 
buyer, or ―long‖) to purchase, and the other party (the seller, or ―short‖) to 
deliver a specified quantity of a specified asset, or underlying commodity, 
at a specified future date and at a specified price.
193
 In the United States, 
the Chicago Board of Trade (―CBOT‖) began listing grain futures in the 
mid-1860s.
194
 In the early twentieth century, rampant speculation in 
commodities and commodity futures, and the spread of ―bucket shops,‖195 
led the farming community to lobby for federal regulation of futures 
trading.
196
 In 1921, Congress enacted the Future Trading Act, which 
sought to outlaw bucket shops.
197
 After the statute was declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court,
198
 Congress enacted the Grain 
Futures Act of 1922.
199
 The statutory scheme for regulation of futures was 
revised several times after 1922.
200
 In 1974, Congress enacted the 
Commodity Exchange Act (the ―CEA‖),201 and created the CFTC as an 
independent federal agency overseeing the markets for commodity futures 
and options.
202
 
 
 
 192. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 193. Futures are functionally similar to forward contracts. Unlike forwards, however, futures are 
standardized, traded on organized exchanges, and typically settled in cash. See Krawiec, supra note 16, 
at 10. 
 194. From Water Street to the World, CHI. MERCANTILE EXCH. GRP.,  http://www.cmegroup.com/ 
company/history/magazine/Summer2007/FromWaterStreetToTheWorld.html (last visited May 11, 
2012).  
 195. A ―bucket shop‖ was a gambling operation whereby the shop operator took customers‘ bets 
on price movement of various commodities but did not place orders on an exchange. See, e.g., Thomas 
Lee Hazen, Public Policy: Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling?—Derivatives Securities 
and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 987, 
1014–17 (1992).  
 196. For an analysis of the political origins of federal futures regulation, see Roberta Romano, The 
Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities Regulation, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 279 (1997). 
 197. 42 Stat. 187 (Aug. 24, 1921). 
 198. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922). 
 199. 42 Stat. 998 (Sept. 21, 1922), 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1922). 
 200. See Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices—The Unprosecutable 
Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281 (1991) (detailing the history of the commodity futures regulation). 
 201. 7 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq (2006). 
 202. The CFTC consists of five Commissioners appointed by the President, with advice and 
consent of the Senate, for five-year terms. The President designates one of the Commissioners as the 
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The CEA, administered by the CFTC, regulates the offer and sale of 
futures contracts and commodity options, the operation of futures 
exchanges, and the activities of various futures market participants. Under 
the broad statutory definition of ―commodity,‖ almost all futures contracts 
are subject to the CEA.
203
 In contrast to disclosure-based securities 
regulation, the CEA establishes broad categories of permissible and 
impermissible transactions. Unless specifically exempted, commodity 
futures and options must be offered and sold on futures exchanges or other 
organized contract markets.
204
 Contracts entered into in contravention of 
the statutory requirements are illegal and unenforceable, and participants 
in such illegal transactions are subject to a wide array of civil and criminal 
penalties.
205
  
The CEA‘s key policy objectives are:  
To deter and prevent price manipulation or any other disruptions to 
market integrity; to ensure the financial integrity of all transactions 
subject to this chapter and the avoidance of systemic risk; to protect 
all market participants from fraudulent or other abusive sales 
practices and misuses of customer assets; and to promote 
responsible innovation and fair competition among boards of trade, 
other markets and market participants.
206
 
Preventing fraud and price manipulation in the U.S. futures and related 
cash commodity markets has always been the central driving force behind 
the federal regulatory scheme.
207
 The CEA emphasizes that futures serve 
―a national public interest by providing a means of managing and 
assuming price risks, discovering prices, or disseminating pricing 
information.‖208 As a result of this special ―utility‖ function, ―futures 
trading occupies a somewhat unique economic position in the eyes of the 
law.‖209  
 
 
Chairperson. For more information on the CFTC, see U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM‘N, 
http://www.cftc.gov/index.htm (last viewed May 11, 2012).  
 203. See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(4) (defining the term ―commodity‖). 
 204. 7 U.S.C. § 6. 
 205. 7 U.S.C. § 13. 
 206. 7 U.S.C. § 5(b). 
 207. The federal regulatory regime for futures markets was initially created in response to 
producers‘ complaints about the economically-harmful effects of widespread commodity and futures 
market manipulation through ―corners‖, ―squeezes‖, and ―bucket shop‖ speculation. See Romano, 
supra note 196. 
 208. 7 U.S.C. § 5(a). 
 209. PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COMMODITIES REGULATION 261 (2d ed. 
1989). 
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2. Pre-CFMA Regulatory Regime: Contract Designation and the 
Concept of Economic Purpose  
Before the enactment of the CFMA in 2000, one of the most significant 
provisions of the CEA was section 5a(a)(12) that required the terms and 
conditions of all futures contracts to be pre-approved for trading by the 
CFTC.
210
 This requirement reflected the statute‘s original concern with 
excessive speculation that negatively affected the underlying commodity 
markets. As the leading treatise explained: 
At nearly every turn, the Act reiterates the utility of futures trading 
for (1) hedging against price risks, (2) the discovery of prices 
through vigorous competition, and (3) the actual pricing of 
commercial commodity transactions. While futures contracts offer, 
certainly, an investment opportunity as well, that feature seems in 
the Act to be subordinate or secondary in importance to the 
commercial uses that those markets offer. . . . [I]t does not appear 
that a futures contract with a pure investment purpose must 
necessarily be foreclosed, but the history of administration of the 
Act leaves little doubt that a futures contract without a commercial 
purpose faces long odds of ever being approved by the 
Commission.
211
 
This dichotomy between commercial and ―purely investment‖ purposes 
of futures contracts reflects a fundamental tension in the CEA regime. The 
CEA has never contained an explicit requirement of commercial utility as 
a condition of contract designation. Prior to 1974, the statute did not 
specify whether or not futures contracts with purely investment (as 
opposed to bona fide commercial hedging or price discovery) purposes 
should be approved for trading.
212
 In 1974, the House of Representatives 
passed a bill, H.R. 13113, which sought to prohibit authorization of any 
contract unless that contract served a bona fide economic function, either 
as a price discovery mechanism or as a device for those in the related cash 
 
 
 210. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(a)(12) (1999). Before the CFMA, this subsection was ―one of the most 
important in both legal and practical effect.‖ PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 
DERIVATIVES REGULATION 180 (2004) [hereinafter DERIVATIVES REGULATION]. 
 211. JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 209, at 261 (footnote omitted).  
 212. Before 1974, the statute did not explicitly require an affirmative regulatory pre-approval of 
the terms of futures contracts. Since 1968, the Secretary of Agriculture had only the power to 
disapprove any trading rule of a contract market, which violated the statute. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(8) (pre-
1974). 
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commodity markets to hedge their commercial, as opposed to investment, 
risks.
213
 The industry objected to this prospective economic purpose test, 
arguing that it was difficult to predict the ultimate uses of a new 
product.
214
 In response to industry pressure, the Senate rejected an explicit 
―economic purpose‖ test for approval of futures contracts and substituted 
it with a more vaguely stated ―public interest‖ test.215 As adopted, the CEA 
contained the Senate‘s provision that conditioned approval of futures 
contracts on the affirmative demonstration by the board of trade that 
―transactions for future delivery in the commodity for which designation 
as a contract market is sought will not be contrary to the public 
interest.‖216  
At the same time, however, the Conference Committee report that 
accompanied the original enactment of this provision in 1974 noted that 
the ―broader language of the Senate provision would include the concept 
of the ‗economic purpose‘ test provided in the House bill subject to the 
final test of the ‗public interest.‘‖217 The newly established CFTC 
interpreted this language as requiring that every futures contract had to 
meet both the broad ―public interest‖ and the more specific ―economic 
purpose‖ tests.218  
The key requirements for contract designation were set forth in sections 
5 and 5a of the CEA.
219
 In essence, the statute required the exchange 
applying for designation to make an affirmative showing that the contract 
provided for delivery of the underlying commodity at a location where 
there was a sufficiently active and liquid cash market and where the 
 
 
 213. Specifically, H.R. 13113 stipulated that the contract should not be approved unless 
[T]he board of trade demonstrates that the prices involved in transactions for future delivery 
in the commodity for which designation as a contract market is sought are, or reasonably can 
be expected to be, generally quoted and disseminated as a basis for determining prices to 
producers, merchants, or consumers of such commodity or the products or byproducts thereof 
or that such transactions are, or reasonably can be expected to be utilized by producers, 
merchants or consumers engaged in handling such commodity or the products or byproducts 
thereof in interstate commerce as a means of hedging themselves against possible loss 
through fluctuations in price. 
JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 209, at 262 (quoting REPORT ON H.R. 13113 OF THE HOUSE 
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, H.R. REP. NO. 93-975, at 103 (2d Sess. 1974)). 
 214. Id. at 263 n.3.  
 215. Id. at 263 (citing REPORT ON H.R. 13113 OF THE SENATE AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY 
COMMITTEE, S. REP. NO. 93-1131, at 72 (2d Sess. 1974)). 
 216. 7 U.S.C. § 7(7) (1999) (repealed 2000). 
 217. JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 209, at 263 (citing REPORT ON H.R. 13113 OF THE 
COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. REP. NO. 93-1383, at 14 (2d Sess. 1974)).  
 218. Id. at 264. 
 219. 7 U.S.C. §§ 7, 7a (1999). 
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exchange had official inspection facilities.
220
 This provision aimed to 
ensure the existence, at a point of delivery, of a liquid cash market in 
which the ―shorts‖ could buy the necessary quantities of the underlying 
commodity for delivery and the ―longs‖ could resell the commodity after 
taking delivery.
221
 Clearly, this language contemplated an actual delivery 
of the underlying commodity, thus tying the futures instrument to a 
commercial activity: trade in the underlying commodity. 
The new contracts also had to pass the statutory ―public interest‖ 
test.
222
 Despite the open-ended nature of this standard, the CFTC‘s view 
was that, as a practical matter, only futures contracts that had commercial 
utility and had potential to facilitate bona fide commercial hedging or 
price discovery in the underlying commodity markets could also pass the 
―public interest‖ test of Section 5(g). As a practical matter, it was assumed 
that futures contracts that had no economic purpose other than financial 
investment were not viable in the long run, as trading in such futures 
would be especially vulnerable to speculative ups and downs.
223
 Thus, 
futures exchanges were expected to design and list for trading contracts 
that had ―a solid base of commercial hedging or pricing participation.‖224 
In addition to the substantive review of the terms of the proposed 
contracts, the CFTC had to scrutinize the exchanges‘ internal policies, 
procedures, and practices to ascertain their ability to monitor trading in the 
proposed futures contract. If the CFTC was not satisfied with an 
exchange‘s ability to ensure market integrity and limit the potential for 
market manipulation and other trading abuses, it could deny 
designation.
225
 Thus, the statute linked the viability and functional utility 
of a futures contract to the exchanges‘ self-regulatory capacity. 
As part of the contract designation process, the CFTC had statutory 
authority to mandate changes in the specific terms of the proposed futures 
contracts if such changes would ―tend to prevent or diminish price 
manipulation, market congestion, or the abnormal movement of such 
 
 
 220. 7 U.S.C. § 7(1) (1999) (repealed 2000). The statute required that the commodity was 
deliverable ―at a terminal market where [it] is sold in sufficient volumes and under such conditions as 
fairly to reflect the general value of the commodity and the differences in value between the various 
grades of such commodity.‖ Id. 
 221. JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 209, at 267. 
 222. 7 U.S.C. § 7(7) (1999) (repealed 2000). 
 223. JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 209, at 270 (―While, . . . the threshold public interest 
standard for designation of new futures contracts may not embrace, necessarily, the specific economic 
purpose test that the Congress considered in 1974, it seems clear that a proposed futures contract that 
is not sound as an economic matter will rarely if ever serve either public or private interests.‖). 
 224. Id. at 264. 
 225. 7 U.S.C. § 7(4) (1999) (repealed 2000). 
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commodity in interstate commerce.‖226 The exercise of power, however, 
was subject to strict procedural constraints, which showed Congressional 
reluctance to allow the regulator to substitute its judgment for that of an 
exchange.
227
 Even though the CFTC did not use this power often, it 
functioned as a credible threat prompting exchanges to be responsive to 
the regulator‘s comments.228 
The statute imposed other procedural requirements on the CFTC, 
including various timeframes for approval decisions
229
 and requirements to 
consult with other federal regulatory agencies.
230
 In addition, the CFTC 
had to publish in the Federal Register notice of proposed exchange rules 
and amendments that were of ―major economic significance‖ and afford 
all interested persons an opportunity to submit comments on the 
proposals.
231
 Applications for contract designation were typically viewed 
as having such significance.  
To assist exchanges in preparing applications for product approval, the 
CFTC adopted Guideline No. 1, which detailed the information to be 
submitted to the agency.
232
 Reflecting the CFTC‘s original position that 
the statutory public interest standard encompassed an economic purpose 
test, the Guideline required that an exchange make an affirmative showing 
that the proposed new contract was ―reasonably expected to serve, on 
more than occasional basis,‖ as a price discovery or hedging tool for 
commercial users of the underlying commodity.
233
 The Guideline required 
the applicants to describe and justify specific economic terms of the 
 
 
 226. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(a)(10) (1999) (repealed 2000). 
 227. Id. Before directing the change in contract terms, the CFTC had to provide the applying 
exchange with an initial notice and an opportunity to correct the problem within seventy-five days. If 
the CFTC was not satisfied, it had to give the exchange another notice and opportunity for a hearing 
before exercising its power to change the terms of the contract. The exchange could file an exception 
to the changes before the CFTC‘s order became effective. Id. 
 228. JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 209, at 268–69 (―To date, the Commission has not formally 
exercised its authority under section 5a(10), but like the gunboat in the harbor, its existence has proven 
effective in encouraging the markets to rethink certain of their contracts.‖). 
 229. Since 1983, the CFTC generally had up to one year to render a final decision on contract 
designation. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(12)(A) (1999) (repealed 2000). In 1997, in response to the industry‘s 
complaints about the competitive harm caused by the long product roll-out timetable, the CFTC 
adopted a rule that allowed certain contracts to be approved on a ―fast track.‖ Such contracts were 
deemed approved within ten days of application for designation, in the absence of an adverse action by 
the CFTC. All the other new contracts were deemed approved within forty-five days, unless the CFTC 
notified the exchange otherwise. 17 C.F.R. § 5.1 (1999). 
 230. Thus, the CEA required the CFTC to provide the Treasury Department and the Federal 
Reserve with at least forty-five days to comment on any proposed futures contract involving U.S. 
Government obligations. 7 U.S.C. § 4a(g)(2) (1999) (repealed 2000). 
 231. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(a)(12)(A) (1999) (repealed 2000).  
 232. 17 C.F.R. § 40, App. A (formerly 17 C.F.R. § 5, App. A).  
 233. Id., items (a)(4) (physically-settled contracts), (b)(4) (cash-settled contracts). 
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contracts, such as delivery points, price differentials for different 
commodity grades, and many others.
234
 In particular, the application had to 
explain and justify any deviation of contract terms and conditions from 
standard industry practices.
235
  
Thus, between 1974 and 2000, commodity futures were subject to the 
statutory regime of mandatory product approval regulation. Under that 
regime, futures exchanges had an affirmative obligation to demonstrate, to 
the CFTC‘s satisfaction, that every contract they intended to list was 
reasonably expected to facilitate efficient pricing and hedging against 
commercial risks in the underlying commodity markets. Under the 
CFTC‘s approach, only contracts that satisfied this economic purpose 
requirement could also be expected to meet the statutory ―public interest‖ 
test for contract designation.  
It is difficult to tell with certainty how rigorously the CFTC fulfilled its 
product approval mandate in practice, particularly given the structure of 
the industry dominated by a few powerful exchanges. The dynamics of the 
CFTC‘s relationship with futures exchanges, which themselves act as 
quasi-public authorities in their capacity as self-regulatory organizations, 
are inherently more cooperative than adversarial.
236
 In this context, 
regulators may prefer using less formal methods of persuasion and 
communication with the industry rather than public exercises of punitive 
power.
237
 It also increases the likelihood of agency capture by the industry 
interests.  
 
 
 234. Id., items (a)(3) (physically-settled contracts), (b)(3) (cash-settled contracts). These 
justifications generally had to be based on appropriate economic data and not solely on expert opinion. 
See JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 209, at 273. 
 235. 17 C.F.R. § 40, App. A, items (a)(3) (physically-settled contracts), (b)(3) (cash-settled 
contracts). 
 236. This is widely understood as an important factor explaining the ―cultural‖ differences 
between the CFTC and the enforcement-oriented SEC. See Jerry W. Markham, Merging the SEC and 
CFTC—A Clash of Cultures, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 537, 591–92 (2009) (contrasting the ―hands-off 
regulatory attitude‖ of the CFTC staff with the ―pro-regulatory stance‖ of the attorney-dominated 
SEC). 
 237. Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the effects of this ―cozy‖ relationship between 
the CFTC and the futures exchanges. One example of the CFTC‘s use of its statutory product approval 
powers was the unusually intense controversy over the CBOT‘s corn and soybean futures contracts in 
1996–98. In December 1996, the CFTC notified the CBOT that the delivery terms for its long-standing 
corn and soybean futures were ―no longer adequate to prevent price manipulation, market congestion, 
or abnormal movement of the commodities in commerce,‖ as required by the CEA. Delivery for CBT 
Corn, Soybean Contracts No Longer Adequate, CFTC Tells Exchange, 29 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 
21, 21 (Jan. 3, 1997). After the CBOT finally changed the outdated delivery terms, the CFTC approved 
its application for contract market designation in corn and soybean futures on May 7, 1998. CFTC 
Approves CBT Proposals for Corn and Soybean Futures Contracts, 30 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 
(May 8, 1998). 
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These important issues, however, are beyond the scope of the present 
discussion, which focuses on the statutory design of the contract 
designation regime as a model of financial product approval regulation. 
The core purpose of the CEA contract designation scheme was to prevent 
market manipulation, fraud, excessive speculation, and other abusive 
trading practices that threatened the integrity and efficiency of the U.S. 
commodities markets. One of the fundamental normative principles 
underlying that regime was the belief that futures markets fulfilled an 
important social function by supporting productive economic activity and, 
therefore, had to be protected from being turned into a venue for pure 
financial speculation.
238
 
3. The CFMA and the Demise of the Mandatory Product Approval 
Regime  
Before the enactment of the CFMA, mandatory approval of contract 
market rules was one of the CFTC‘s ―most formidable powers and one of 
the exchanges‘ most burdensome duties.‖239 It was also one of the key 
factors that made the CEA ―an important—if often overlooked—
antispeculation law.‖240 In the 1990s, futures exchanges and financial 
institutions active in the growing OTC derivatives markets heavily lobbied 
for deregulating commodity futures trading and eliminating the 
requirement of prior contract approval. 
The political pressure to liberalize the CEA regime reflected the 
fundamental changes in the nature of the futures markets.
241
 When the 
Future Trading Act was enacted, the majority of futures were tied to 
agricultural commodities, and manipulative trading strategies in the 
futures markets directly affected farmers and other commercial producers 
and users of the physical commodities. With the advent of financial 
futures—contracts with the underlying financial assets rather than physical 
commodities—financial institutions and professional investors became the 
dominant players in the futures markets.
242
 These financially sophisticated 
investors did not see the need for the governmental ―micromanagement‖ 
of futures markets and pushed for liberalization of the existing rules.
243
  
 
 
 238. See supra note 206–207 and accompanying text. 
 239. DERIVATIVES REGULATION, supra note 210, at 180. 
 240. Lynn A. Stout, Why The Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the 
Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 705 (1999). 
 241. DERIVATIVES REGULATION, supra note 210, at 182. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
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As trading in financial futures came to dominate futures trading and 
financial investors far outnumbered commercial users of futures, the entire 
dynamics of the commodity futures markets changed fundamentally. The 
futures market became intricately tied to the exploding OTC derivatives 
markets, which had an advantage of being unregulated and offering 
financial players far more flexibility and greater potential returns.
244
 Non-
U.S. derivatives exchanges began entering the U.S. markets and offering a 
wider range of financial products to U.S. investors.
245
 U.S. futures 
exchanges forcefully argued that the CFTC approval process caused 
significant delays in product listing and prevented them from competing 
with foreign exchanges and the OTC derivatives markets.  
In 1997, the CFTC responded by creating a ―fast-track‖ contract 
approval procedure for certain commodities, under which a contract was 
deemed approved within ten days after submission unless the CFTC 
notified the exchange otherwise.
246
 That did not satisfy the futures 
industry, however. The new opportunity to liberalize the product approval 
regime came after Brooksley Born, an outspoken advocate of stronger 
derivatives regulation, resigned from her post as the Chair of the CFTC on 
June 1, 1999. William Rainer, a private investment manager with reported 
ties to President Clinton, was nominated as the new CFTC head on June 
23, 1999, and quickly confirmed by the Senate.
247
 On June 25, 1999, the 
CBOT, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and the New York Mercantile 
Exchange petitioned the CFTC, among other things, to exempt U.S. 
futures exchanges from the regulatory contract approval process.
248
 On 
November 17, 1999, responding to this petition, the CFTC adopted new 
regulation that permitted futures exchanges to list new contracts for 
 
 
 244. See generally REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT‘S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, 
OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT (Nov. 1999), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/documents/otcact.pdf (discussing the 
growth of the OTC derivatives markets and its impact on the futures markets and regulation). The 
growth of OTC derivatives in the 1980s–90s raised difficult legal and regulatory questions and created 
a bitter jurisdictional and administrative turf war between the CFTC and the SEC. Id. at 6–15. An 
examination of this inter-agency struggle is beyond the scope of this Article.  
 245. In the late 1990s, the CFTC granted no-action relief to several foreign boards of trade, 
including Germany‘s Eurex, France‘s ParisBourse, and England‘s LIFFE, allowing them to establish 
electronic terminals in the U.S. without having to meet contract market designation requirements of 
the CEA. See, e.g., Eurex, ParisBourse Gain Access to Systems from Within U.S., 31 SEC. REG. & L. 
REP. (BNA) 1095 (Aug. 13, 1999). 
 246. 17 C.F.R. § 5.1 (1999). See also supra note 229. 
 247. See William Rainer, MARKETS WIKI, http://www.marketswiki.com/mwiki/William_J._Rainer 
#cite_note-5 (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).  
 248. See 64 Fed. Reg. 46,356 (Aug. 25, 1999). 
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trading pursuant to exchange certification, without prior Commission 
approval.
249
  
In January 2000, the CFTC published a report entitled ―A New 
Regulatory Framework,‖ which laid down a program of massive 
liberalization of U.S. commodity futures regulation.
250
 Among other 
things, the report advocated a switch from the traditionally prescriptive 
rules-based regulatory regime to a principles-based framework, which 
would give far greater operational flexibility to futures exchanges.
251
 As 
part of that switch, the CFTC recommended eliminating the mandatory 
contract designation process in favor of exchange certification of new 
products‘ compliance with the CEA.252  
On December 15, 2000, Congress passed the CFMA, a comprehensive 
piece of legislation that incorporated most of the CFTC‘s proposals and 
radically liberalized the regulatory regime for futures and OTC 
derivatives.
253
 Among other things, the CFMA repealed section 5a(a)(12) 
of the CEA and eliminated the requirement of prior approval by the CFTC 
of exchanges‘ rules and products. The new law allowed regulated 
exchanges to list futures contracts upon a written self-certification that 
such products complied with the requirements of the CEA, as amended.
254
 
Exchanges could also voluntarily request the CFTC‘s pre-trading approval 
for their contracts, which gave them the right to label such contracts as 
approved by the CFTC.
255
  
 
 
 249. See Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC Approves Action to 
Advance Regulatory Reform (Nov. 17, 1999), available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press99/opa4339-
99.htm.  
 250. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: REPORT 
OF THE COMMODITY FUTURES COMMISSION STAFF TASK FORCE (2000) [hereinafter NEW 
FRAMEWORK], available at http://www.cftc.gov/files/opa/oparegulatoryframework.pdf.  
 251. The principles-based approach to regulation was made popular by, and became associated 
with, the United Kingdom‘s Financial Services Authority (―FSA‖). In the decade before the crisis, the 
FSA was widely praised as a ―risk-based‖ and ―principles-based‖ regulator that built a more business-
friendly regulatory environment, which attracted more financial institutions and transactions to 
London. See Markham, supra note 236, at 544–47 (describing the prevailing attitudes toward the 
FSA‘s principles-based regulatory approach before and after the crisis). 
 252. NEW FRAMEWORK, supra note 250, at 14. 
 253. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, H.R. 5660, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 2000). 
The CFMA created several tiers of contract markets, subject to different levels of regulatory oversight. 
In addition to fully regulated ―designated contract markets‖ (―DCMs‖), the statute created a new 
category of a ―derivatives trade execution facility‖ (―DTEF‖) that was subject to less stringent 
regulation. 7 U.S.C. § 7a (2000). Finally, certain markets could qualify as ―exempt boards of trade‖ 
subject only to the anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions of the CEA. 7 U.S.C. § 7a-3(a) (2000). 
 254. 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(1).  
 255. 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(2)(A). Curiously, Rainer submitted his resignation from the post of the 
CFTC Chairman on December 20, 2000, only five days after Congress passed the CFMA, in order to 
return to private industry. See Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n, CFTC Chairman 
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These fundamental changes in the market profile, dynamics, and the 
regulatory framework put the traditional notion of commercial utility of 
futures contracts under an increasing strain. Nevertheless, even the post-
CFMA futures regulation retained a strong built-in anti-speculative 
tendency. Thus, under the CFMA, regulated exchanges do not have to get 
separate designation for each futures contract, but must comply with the 
applicable core principles.
256
 One such core principle requires an exchange 
to list ―only contracts that are not readily susceptible to manipulation.‖257 
Potential for market manipulation is particularly high where a futures 
instrument is designed primarily as an instrument of speculative 
investment. The revised Guideline No. 1, which provided guidance to 
exchanges seeking voluntary pre-approval of their contracts, retained the 
same basic requirements with respect to showing the economic function of 
the proposed contracts as a hedging or pricing mechanism for the 
underlying commodity markets.
258
 In addition, the CFMA retained the 
requirement that exchanges establish position limits for speculators in 
order to ―reduce the potential threat of market manipulation or 
congestion.‖259 Thus, even the greatly financialized, globalized, and 
liberalized futures markets, which are very different from the futures 
markets of the 1920s, cannot entirely extricate themselves from the 
underlying cash markets and the policy goal of preventing potential harm 
to such markets from excessive financial speculation.
260
 
D. Learning from Experience: Politics, Precaution, and Efficiency 
Despite their many differences, the experiences of the FDA, REACH, 
and the CFTC allow us to draw some potentially relevant generalizations. 
One important insight is the central role of interest group dynamics and 
political factors in determining how robust and successful the product 
approval regime is in practice. One of the most bitterly contested issues is 
 
 
William J. Rainer Resigns (Dec. 20, 2000), available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press00/opa4480-
00.htm. While it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions, the changes that took place during Rainer‘s 
tenure at the CFTC and the timing of his resignation suggest that his mission at the agency was to 
accomplish a comprehensive deregulatory reform. 
 256. 7 U.S.C. § 7(d). 
 257. 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(3). 
 258. See supra notes 232–35 and accompanying text. 
 259. 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(5). 
 260. The Dodd-Frank Act significantly amended the CEA, primarily to reflect the new clearing 
and trading requirements applicable to certain standardized derivatives. See Dodd-Frank Act, Title VII, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1955 (codified in scattered sections of 7 and 15 U.S.C.). However, an 
analysis of these amendments is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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the length of the approval process, as the industry actors protest the delay 
in their product marketing. In the futures industry, the exchanges 
successfully argued that the CFTC‘s contract designation process hurt 
their ability to compete with OTC derivatives and foreign futures markets. 
Their political lobbying has finally led to the elimination of the mandatory 
contract designation requirement. Similarly, pharmaceutical companies 
fight against what they see as unreasonable delays in approving new drugs 
by the overly cautious FDA. On the other hand, the EC‘s ability to 
introduce an ambitious program that mandates massive and costly testing 
for all existing high-volume chemicals, despite the industry‘s resistance, 
exemplifies the power of a political commitment to making the world safer 
for human beings and their environment. The industry‘s complaints about 
the exorbitant costs, while certainly affecting how the REACH program 
operates, failed to stop the EU authorities from enacting the regulation. 
In all of these cases, the industry groups‘ political lobbying was 
particularly successful when they invoked a sufficiently strong 
countervailing public interest. Thus, pharmaceutical firms were able to 
shift power away from the FDA only when they mobilized patient 
advocacy groups to push for faster approval of certain drugs by the FDA, 
in the interests of patients who could potentially benefit from those drugs. 
Similarly, in the late 1990s, commodity futures exchanges made global 
competitiveness and efficiency of U.S. financial markets their battle cry in 
the struggle for repeal of the mandatory contract designation requirements. 
These legitimate public interest arguments provided a normative 
alternative to the policies underlying the statutory product approval 
schemes.  
Yet, the FDA drug approval regime remains beyond a serious threat of 
abolition, despite the increasing pressure from pharmaceutical firms and 
patient advocates to change the agency‘s practices. Although REACH is 
still in the early stages of implementation, there is hardly any doubt that it 
is going forward. By contrast, the CFTC‘s mandatory contract designation 
was dismantled under industry pressure and without much public 
attention. The substance of the underlying policy goals may explain, at 
least partly, the difference in their relative viability.
261
 Thus, both REACH 
and the FDA‘s system of new drug approval serve the purpose that is 
difficult to contest politically: protection of human life and health. These 
 
 
 261. There may also be important differences in the regulatory capacity and culture of these 
different agencies, the structural context in which these agencies operate, and a variety of other factors 
that affect their respective ability to enforce statutory requirements in practice. These issues, however, 
are not directly relevant for the purposes of the present discussion. 
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regulatory regimes embody, with some variations, the model of explicitly 
precautionary risk regulation. The CFTC‘s contract designation scheme 
was aimed primarily at preventing excessive speculation that increased 
chances of market manipulation. That policy priority, however, is highly 
contestable and vulnerable to competing visions of ―public good‖ 
advanced by the financial services industry. To the extent the CFTC‘s 
product approval scheme was conceptualized primarily as a matter of 
market efficiency, it had a much weaker normative basis to support its 
continuation as a socially desirable precautionary measure, especially in 
the face of concerted private efforts to deregulate.  
It is reasonable to conclude that one of the critical factors in designing 
any product approval regime is a clear articulation and justification of 
policy priorities that such regime seeks to implement. It is, however, a 
complicated task that involves potentially difficult political choices. This 
is particularly true to the extent a proposed product approval scheme is 
structured similarly to the CFTC‘s pre-2000 model. Given the high degree 
of contestability of policy priorities in financial services regulation, it is 
critical to assert clearly the normative basis on which the proposed product 
approval system would operate and to address explicitly the competing 
public and private interests. Reflecting key lessons of the recent crisis, this 
new normative paradigm should explicitly incorporate both the principle 
of precautionary risk regulation and the goal of enhancing economic and 
market efficiency and utility by reducing excessive speculation and 
arbitrage. An unequivocal statement of these overriding policy priorities 
may not eliminate political opposition to the proposal entirely, but may 
enhance the regulatory regime‘s ability to withstand it in the long run.  
Of course, it is easy to overdraw the parallels between these three 
models of product approval regulation and an idea of instituting a 
licensing regime for complex financial products. Significant differences in 
the nature of the regulated activity, the structure of the regulated industry, 
and the dynamics between private market participants and government 
regulators limit our ability to emulate unique features of any particular 
regime in a different regulatory realm. For instance, one of the central 
elements of both the FDA regime and REACH program is the requirement 
of pre-market testing of drugs and chemicals. In both cases, companies 
must produce scientific data to demonstrate that their products do not pose 
unacceptable risks. Although the validity of specific scientific claims is 
often uncertain and disputed, as a general matter, regulatory decisions to 
grant or deny market entry fundamentally rest on an objective 
experimental basis. In the area of financial services regulation, 
experimental testing is generally not feasible and mathematical modeling 
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is not fully reliable as the basis for decision-making. Even the CFTC‘s 
experience with mandatory approval of futures may not be directly 
applicable to the broader universe of financial products. Futures contracts 
were created and submitted for approval by a small number of futures 
exchanges, self-regulatory organizations whose interests were more clearly 
aligned with the public interest in protecting market integrity. Dealing 
with a far greater number of diverse private firms whose interests are not 
so aligned may fundamentally alter the regulatory dynamics and introduce 
a different set of challenges. 
Finally, it is important to remember that none of the three models of 
product licensing examined above directly targeted systemic risk as the 
main object of regulation. Devising a regime of financial product approval, 
which explicitly seeks to minimize systemic risk posed by private 
economic activities, is a uniquely challenging task. Nevertheless, even 
though none of these three regulatory schemes is a perfect analogy, 
understanding their basic features is helpful in framing the discussion of 
whether—and, more importantly, how—a product approval regime can 
work in the financial services sector. 
III. MANDATORY APPROVAL OF COMPLEX FINANCIAL PRODUCTS: 
CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITIES 
This Part examines the potential structure and process of approval 
regulation for complex financial products. It does not purport to present a 
complete prescription for immediate action. Rather, it is an intellectual 
experiment, an attempt to push the boundaries of what is conceivable and 
start outlining the basic contours of a new ex ante regulatory approach to 
controlling systemic risk.  
A product approval regime envisioned here targets one of the core 
causes of systemic risk in the financial services sector: strategic 
complexity introduced into the system by financial intermediaries 
primarily for the purposes of extracting higher rents and enabling 
excessive speculation and regulatory arbitrage.
262
 This Part discusses key 
elements of a statutory scheme establishing such a regime, and identifies 
potential problems with designing and implementing it in practice. Despite 
the remaining open questions and feasibility challenges, the proposed 
system of mandatory pre-approval for complex financial products may 
serve as an effective gatekeeping device that limits socially useless 
 
 
 262. See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text. 
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financial engineering and offers a potentially powerful new solution to the 
seemingly intractable problem of systemic risk regulation.  
A. Licensing of Complex Financial Products: Could It Work? 
It is difficult to articulate in full all of the important details of a new 
regulatory mechanism for pre-approval of complex financial products. 
Many instruments and transactions that would be subject to this regime are 
currently regulated under different schemes, and some may not be 
regulated in a meaningful way at all. Many instruments cross the 
functional lines among various economic and regulatory categories of 
products, which further complicates the task of formulating clear 
definitions. Today‘s financial markets bring together a variety of 
participants that often pursue complex trading and investment strategies 
blurring the boundaries among issuers and investors, lenders and 
borrowers, market-makers and end-users. Finally, as a result of the 
enactment and ongoing implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, the entire 
regulatory structure is currently in a state of flux, as the new and old 
agencies are trying to map out their new responsibilities and substantive 
rules.
263
  
In this context, designing a workable system of product approval 
regulation presents substantial challenges. As the first step toward that 
goal, this section outlines the key elements of such a system and, to the 
extent precise definitions are hard to formulate, attempts to sketch out 
some basic principles for approaching that task. Inevitably, this is more of 
an exercise in creative thinking than a detailed legislative proposal.  
1. Purposes and Criteria of Product Approval 
The overarching policy objective of the proposed product approval 
regime should be to control the proliferation of complex financial products 
that potentially pose heightened systemic risk. As a corollary to that 
policy, the new regulatory regime should explicitly aim at preventing 
excessive speculation and reducing regulatory arbitrage in the financial 
sector. It is critical that the enabling statute clearly establishes that, in the 
 
 
 263. While it may be possible to build a financial product approval scheme into the emerging 
post-Dodd-Frank regulatory structure, doing so may create internal inconsistencies and redundancies 
and potentially compromise the integrity of the proposed regime. Fundamentally, the proposal 
advanced here is an alternative, rather than a supplement, to the Dodd-Frank Act. Therefore, the 
following discussion assumes that Congress will have to pass a new statute establishing the proposed 
product approval scheme and mandating the necessary changes to the broader regulatory framework. 
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absence of compelling policy reasons to do otherwise, these goals take 
precedence over any considerations based on the economic interests of 
private market participants.
264
 
This is a different set of objectives than ensuring the safety of financial 
products for their users or consumers, as proposed by Stiglitz, Carpenter, 
Bar-Gill, and Warren.
265
 One of the criticisms of their proposals was the 
inherent difficulty of defining the concept of ―safety,‖ especially given its 
relative nature. Thus, a certain level of risk associated with a product may 
be ―unsafe‖ for one category of consumers but ―safe‖ for another, 
depending on their financial sophistication and resources. One potential 
solution is to mandate full disclosure warning prospective consumers of a 
product‘s risks, but allow so-called ―off-label‖ use.266 This solution, 
however, may undermine the integrity of the safety oriented product 
approval regime by allowing potentially unsafe products to enter the 
market. In the financial market, this could cause potentially irreversible 
damage to systemic stability. Framing the policy goals of the mandatory 
financial product licensing regime in terms of systemic risk associated 
with strategic complexity, financial speculation, and arbitrage removes 
this problem of differentiating among target users of a financial 
instrument. Because the regime proposed here focuses explicitly on 
protection of the legitimate public interest in reducing systemic risk, it 
should deflect criticisms of excessively ―paternalistic‖ government 
interference with individual market participants‘ choices.267 
The key objective of the product licensing review should be to evaluate 
each complex financial product from functional, institutional, and policy 
perspectives. Regulatory approval should be granted only if the 
application meets a three-part statutory standard: (1) an ―economic 
purpose‖ test, which would place the burden of proving the commercial 
and social utility of each proposed financial instrument on the financial 
institutions seeking approval; (2) an ―institutional capacity‖ test, which 
would require a review of the applicant firm‘s ability to monitor and 
 
 
 264. Arguments based on ―market efficiency‖ are often employed to promote private industry 
actors‘ profit-enhancing interests. Economic or market efficiency is a normative concept, despite its 
deliberately cultivated appearance of political neutrality and scientific objectivity: it reflects and 
presumes certain configurations of economic and political power as the ―natural‖ state of market. For 
an insightful discussion of this issue, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 70. 
 265. See supra Part I.C. 
 266. See Carpenter, supra note 108. 
 267. To the extent the government seeks to protect a generalized public interest that private parties 
are not in a position to protect, the government is inherently ―paternalistic.‖ Legal and regulatory 
mandates routinely override individual preferences for various public policy reasons.  
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manage the risks of the proposed product effectively; and (3) a ―systemic 
effects‖ test, which would require a finding that approval of the proposed 
product does not pose an unacceptable risk of increasing systemic 
vulnerability and does not raise significant public policy concerns.  
a. The ―Economic Purpose‖ Test 
First, the applying financial institution would have to make an 
affirmative showing that the proposed complex financial instrument has a 
bona fide economic purpose that promotes productive enterprise and does 
not merely provide another means of financial speculation or regulatory 
arbitrage. The goal of the product approval regime is to discourage 
financial institutions from creating and marketing complex financial 
instruments, where the benefits of such complexity for the economy and 
broader society do not outweigh potential increases in systemic risk. Thus, 
this test specifically targets strategic complexity that enables market actors 
to avoid regulatory constraints, hide the true extent of their leverage, and 
engage in financial speculation. 
The main conceptual difficulty here is defining precisely what 
constitutes an impermissibly ―speculative‖ investment. Speculation is 
often an elusive concept.
268
 Because of the inherent uncertainty of future 
returns on any financial investment, all investing activity may be viewed 
as a form of speculation.
269
 At the same time, it is hard to deny a common 
intuition that some forms of speculative investment are fundamentally 
different from traditional investing, not only in terms of their economic 
motivation, but also in moral terms.
270
 While this definitional difficulty is 
a legitimate theoretical concern, it is not necessary to provide a statutory 
definition of speculation to establish an effective product approval regime. 
 
 
 268. See Stout, supra note 240, at 735. See also Timothy Lynch, Gambling by Another Name? The 
Challenge of Purely Speculative Derivatives (Ind. Univ. Maurer School of Law-Bloomington Legal 
Research Paper No. 188, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1788219&rec=1&srcabs=1785634.  
 269. The basic distinction between ―speculation‖ and ―hedging‖ as the key categories of potential 
uses of complex financial products, such as derivatives, may be used to draw the line between 
permissible and impermissible transactions. See Posner & Weyl, supra note 9, at 13–15 (discussing 
how the regulator would estimate and balance potential hedging and speculative market demand for a 
product). This approach, however, tends to over-simplify the relationship between these two 
categories. For instance, what should be done with a product that is as a bona fide hedge for an 
underlying speculative position? It may not be readily ascertainable that a specific position that is 
being hedged is a speculative one. Moreover, there may be a long chain of intermediate ―hedging‖ 
transactions that ultimately build up to a highly speculative bet.  
 270. Stout, supra note 240; Hazen, supra note 195. 
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Instead, the goal should be to outline the key factors which the regulator 
would have to analyze as part of the product review.  
To meet the economic purpose test, an applicant firm will have to: 
(1) identify the intended market for the proposed financial product and 
describe potential users of the product; (2) show that the product will 
fulfill a specific business need of potential ―product users,‖ which existing 
financial products fail to fulfill; and (3) demonstrate that this legitimate 
business need significantly outweighs any potential uses of the product for 
speculative investment or regulatory arbitrage as the core motivation for 
the product user (or the applicant firm) to enter into the proposed 
transaction.
271
  
Who the intended users are is an important element of the inquiry, as it 
is closely tied to the determination of the core economic function of the 
proposed financial product. As a general rule, financial instruments 
designed either to allow for hedging of pre-existing risk incurred by the 
user in the course of its ordinary business or to otherwise enhance the 
user‘s ability to conduct productive economic activity would pass the 
economic purpose test.
272
 However, it may be necessary to create a 
rebuttable presumption against approving financial products whose 
identified prospective users include only financial institutions that 
ordinarily engage in financial risk management and transfer as part of their 
core business—banks and their affiliates, securities or insurance firm, and 
hedge funds or other private investment vehicles. The applicant firm can 
overcome this presumption by showing that, for example, the proposed 
financial instrument would enable a financial intermediary to hedge a 
specific financial risk arising directly out of its core business: providing 
capital to productive economic enterprise.
273
  
 
 
 271. The statutory burden of meeting this test will operate to reduce socially useless financial 
innovation driven primarily by supply-side incentives of financial intermediaries. See Awrey, supra 
note 4. 
 272. Hedging pre-existing risk is a core economic function of derivatives instruments. See, e.g., 
Krawiec, supra note 16; Romano, supra note 16. Loan securitization is an example of a financial 
transaction that enhances the originating banks‘ ability to remove loans from their balance sheets and 
free up more funds for increased lending to businesses and individuals, presumably for use in 
productive economic activity. To the extent a particular securitization transaction serves to achieve 
that goal, it has a valid economic purpose. 
 273. Importantly, the application would have to specify that, whenever used for hedging purposes, 
the proposed product is structured as a direct hedge narrowly tailored to a specific risk and does not 
create any additional risks likely to be speculative in nature. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 268. It is also 
important to consider whether the dealer-to-dealer hedging of large portfolio risks should be subject to 
additional restrictions and conditions. There may be a legitimate policy reason to discourage such 
dealer-to-dealer hedging as significantly increasing systemic interconnectedness, complexity, and 
opacity. See supra Part I.A. There may be a strong argument for forcing dealers in complex financial 
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It is important that the application describes the target market for the 
product and the intended economic purpose of the product with sufficient 
specificity.
274
 For instance, it would not be enough to describe the intended 
users of the proposed product in generic terms as ―long-term investors 
searching for yield.‖ Similarly, a claim that the proposed instrument would 
allow financial institutions to broaden their client base, get higher trading 
returns, or receive higher fees would not be enough of an economic 
purpose to justify approval. Vague claims to the effect that the product 
would improve these actors‘—or their clients‘—ability to manage risk in 
their existing portfolio would not be a sufficient basis for approval. The 
key is a reasonably specific and direct link to some productive economic 
activity that exists outside the confines of financial markets.
275
  
Ultimately, the economic purpose standard is a ―facts and 
circumstances‖ test.276 While it is difficult to give a clean theoretical 
definition of what types of products should not be approved as lacking a 
bona fide economic purpose, in reality, it is often not so difficult to see 
what is going on. For example, if a transaction between a hedge fund and a 
dealer-bank is structured as a total return swap tied to performance of a 
basket of equity stock, the dealer-bank applying for approval of that 
transaction will have to explain what the economic substance of that swap 
is, and why it is necessary for the hedge fund to enter into that swap 
instead of borrowing money from a bank and investing it in the underlying 
stock directly. The only real explanation for such a transaction is likely to 
 
 
instruments to manage their risks primarily through reducing their leverage, holding more capital and 
liquid reserves, demanding more and better collateral, and instituting more conservative counterparty 
and other risk management procedures.  
 274. Financial institutions may also be required to provide good-faith estimates of the volume of 
transactions they expect to conduct. If the actual volume exceeds the original estimates, the institution 
would have to request additional approval for the excess deal flow. 
 275. It may be desirable to create an explicit presumption against financial instruments where the 
rights to payments are separated from the ultimate underlying assets by a series of intermediate 
instruments. Examples of such multi-layered complex financial instruments are so-called CDO2 and 
CDO3 that invest in pools of interests in other CDOs. See Re-securitizing CDOs, RISK.NET (Aug. 1, 
2004), http://www.risk.net/credit/feature/1522744/re-securitising-cdos (discussing various types of re-
securitizations). This approach would effectively prohibit multi-layered securitizations, which greatly 
contributed to the latest financial crisis. See TURNER REVIEW, supra note 11, at 15–16 (discussing the 
role of securitized credit in increasing systemic risk). 
 276. In that sense, the ―economic purpose‖ test envisioned here differs from the simple 
quantitative market analysis of ―social utility‖ proposed by Posner and Weyl. Cf. Posner & Weyl, 
supra note 9, at 13–15. As most model-based quantitative tests, their approach appears elegantly 
simple and purports to offer a degree of certainty inherently lacking in a context-sensitive ―facts and 
circumstances‖ analysis. Yet, as most judges, regulators, and practicing lawyers would attest, 
achieving the ―right‖ practical result in a complex situation often involves working through the messy 
pile of individual facts and circumstances. 
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be some form of regulatory arbitrage and the hedge fund‘s search for 
higher leverage to boost profits from betting on stock prices. Unless the 
applicant is able to convince the regulator that (1) the proposed swap 
would produce tangible economic benefits (other than generating profits 
for the counterparties) or directly contribute to some productive economic 
activity, and (2) such socially desirable effects are significant enough to 
overcome the statutory presumption against complexity driven by 
speculation and arbitrage, that total return swap would not pass the 
economic purpose test. 
The firms will have to monitor on an ongoing basis the markets for 
their approved products and report any significant changes in the market 
composition and uses of the relevant products, as these changes may alter 
considerations on which the original approval grant was based.
277
 By tying 
regulatory approval not only to a broad category of transactions—such as 
swaps, equity options, or mortgage-backed securities—but also to specific 
target uses and target users, the proposed regime will ensure continuous 
generation and collection of valuable information on important market 
trends.
278
 This would potentially enable the regulators to monitor these 
trends more effectively, so that they are more likely to react in a timely 
manner when familiar financial instruments start morphing into something 
different in terms of their functions and risk profile.
279
 
It is difficult to overestimate the information-producing potential of the 
proposed product approval regime. It would effectively require financial 
institutions to provide complete quantitative and qualitative disclosure and 
analysis of their activities as dealers and market-makers in complex 
financial products. That alone would provide the regulators with 
meaningful access to internal business and market information that is 
currently unavailable to them. This burden-shifting mechanism would go a 
 
 
 277. This is an important element of the proposed regime, insofar as it would help to detect 
significant post-approval changes in the risk profile of the existing financial products as a result of 
financial innovation and regulatory arbitrage. For an insightful analysis of this phenomenon in the 
context of securitization, see Adam J. Levitin et al., The Dodd-Frank Act and Housing Finance: Can It 
Restore Private Risk Capital to the Securitization Market?, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 155 (2012) (arguing 
that the informational opacity in securitization markets was the key cause of the housing market 
collapse); See also Levitin & Wachter, supra note 35 (arguing that the recent U.S. housing bubble was 
a result of the fundamental shift in the mortgage finance market from regulated to unregulated, private-
label securitization). 
 278. In many respects, this feature of the regime would make it similar to the FDA‘s post-
approval market monitoring and continuing generation of empirical data on safety and efficacy of new 
drugs. See supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text.  
 279. The transformation of traditional residential mortgages and relatively straightforward 
mortgage-backed securitizations into a complex form of financial speculation provides an example of 
such dynamics. See supra note 277. 
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long way toward correcting both the informational asymmetries between 
the regulators and the industry and the existing incentive structure that 
encourages socially harmful risk-taking by financial market actors. In 
effect, the proposed approach would reformulate the currently 
dysfunctional concept of cost-benefit analysis of financial services 
regulation as a more risk-based and socially conscious cost-benefit 
analysis of financial services.
280
 Importantly, it would also allocate the 
duty to produce information necessary to conduct such analysis on the 
party that has full access to such information.  
The proposed regime, however, goes far beyond mere information 
gathering.
281
 By putting the economic purpose test at the center of the 
approval process, the scheme envisioned here builds upon the traditional 
pre-2000 CEA approach that recognized the heightened potential of 
derivative contracts to be used for speculative purposes. The present 
proposal takes that approach to a different level, reflecting the overarching 
policy goal of reducing strategic complexity and systemic risk in financial 
markets. 
b. The ―Institutional Capacity‖ Test 
The second part of the statutory standard would require the applicant to 
demonstrate its internal organizational, operational, and financial capacity 
 
 
 280. In 1981, President Reagan issued an Executive Order requiring administrative agencies to 
submit to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) complete regulatory plans and cost-benefit analyses for all of their ―major rules.‖ See 
Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 821, 824–26 (2003) (outlining the history and impact of Executive Orders 12291 and 12498 on 
OMB). All regulatory agencies other than those specifically exempted under the Paperwork Reduction 
Act, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980) (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3520), are required to 
submit to OIRA drafts of their proposed rules that constitute ―significant‖ regulatory action (generally, 
rules that have an expected annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more) for review. See 
Croley, supra, at 825. This mandatory cost-benefit analysis of regulatory actions tends to overstate the 
more easily quantifiable ―costs‖ to private market actors and understate the far more diffuse and often 
unquantifiable ―benefits‖ to the public. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized 
Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260 (2006) (criticizing the deregulatory 
impact of cost-benefit review of agency rules by OIRA); Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking the Role of 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1355 (2009) (discussing the drawbacks of cost-benefit 
analysis for environmental regulation). Moreover, there is evidence that the financial services industry 
is using the mandatory cost-benefit analysis of agency rules as a procedural tool to slow down the 
implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act. See, e.g., Silla Brush, U.S. Regulators Paralyzed by Cost-
Benefit Suits, Chilton Says, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-
08/u-s-regulators-paralyzed-by-cost-benefit-suits-chilton-says.html (quoting a CFTC member, Bart 
Chilton, as stating that the CFTC is battling the financial industry‘s lawsuits challenging the agency‘s 
new rules on speculation limits as inadequately supported by cost-benefit analysis). 
 281. For a discussion of potential benefits and disadvantages of the purely informational pre-
screening of financial products, see infra Part III.B.4. 
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to monitor and manage risks associated with the proposed product. This 
requirement is similar to the CFTC‘s review of exchanges‘ internal 
capacity to support markets for a new futures contract.
282
  
Again, this part of the test ties regulatory approval to the specific 
context in which a particular product would be used. Thus, even if the 
proposed financial product may have proven economic and social utility, 
as a general matter, it may not be appropriate for a particular financial 
institution that fails to prove its ability to understand, identify, measure, 
monitor, and manage potential risks the product poses to the institution‘s 
own financial health, as well as to the financial well-being of the product‘s 
users and overall market stability. 
To meet this test, the applicant would have to satisfy certain capital 
adequacy or similar requirements limiting an entity‘s ability to incur 
leverage. In addition to meeting the applicable overall regulatory capital 
requirements, regulators may require a higher capital buffer to support the 
specific proposed financial transaction and related market activities. It is 
important, however, not to overestimate the regulatory capital measures as 
effective indicators of a firm‘s financial soundness. Additional factors to 
be considered may include (1) the firm‘s overall business and risk profile, 
(2) the relationship between the proposed activity and the rest of the firm‘s 
business and resources (including human and technological resources), 
(3) internal systems of risk management and regulatory compliance, and 
(4) regulatory and compliance record and history of enforcement against 
the firm or its affiliated entities. It is important to review and evaluate 
whether the firm has effective and thoughtful risk management policies 
and procedures in place, designed specifically for the proposed financial 
product or activity. 
An important consideration in this respect is the actual or potential 
conflict of interest a particular financial institution may face in connection 
with the proposed activity. The inquiry at this point should not be limited 
only to the firm‘s general ability to handle the economic demands of 
dealing in the specific product. It is also necessary to assess how the 
proposed activity may alter the firm‘s economic incentives and overall 
business strategy, and whether or not that change potentially poses 
reputational risks to the firm or raises significant concerns about broader 
market integrity.
283
 To put it simply, the key question has to be, ―Do we 
want this particular institution to trade and deal in this particular product?‖ 
 
 
 282. See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 283. One example highlighting the importance of assessing this type of risk both to the firm‘s 
reputation and to the broader market integrity is Goldman Sachs‘ infamous ―Big Short‖ strategy in 
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This institutional test would also involve assessing the extent to which 
the proposed activity is likely to increase the size or systemic significance 
of an applicant firm so that it becomes ―too big to fail‖ (―TBTF‖) or ―too 
interconnected to fail‖ (―TITF‖). While a product approval mechanism 
alone is not likely to solve the TBTF/TITF problem, it may help to control 
it by limiting financial intermediaries‘ ability to expand trading volumes 
and create additional linkages and channels of contagion in the financial 
markets.
284
  
c. The ―Systemic Effects‖ Test 
Finally, in order to get regulatory approval for its new complex 
financial product, the applicant firm will have to demonstrate that such a 
product does not pose potentially unacceptable systemic risk or is 
otherwise likely to increase the vulnerability of the financial system. This 
broadly stated requirement aims to give the regulator statutory authority to 
consider a wide variety of potentially relevant factors—and public policy 
considerations—that may not be directly included in the description of the 
product or the immediate market needs.  
For instance, this part of the statutory test would operate to prevent 
transactions like the infamous ABACUS 2007 AC-1 deal, whereby 
Goldman Sachs structured and marketed a synthetic collateralized debt 
obligation (―CDO‖)285 referencing a pool of U.S. subprime residential 
mortgage-backed securities. The CDO was structured specifically to 
enable Paulson & Co., one of the world‘s largest hedge funds and 
Goldman Sachs‘ client, to take a large short position against subprime 
mortgage-backed securities, which allowed the fund to collect significant 
profits from the collapse of the U.S. housing market.
286
 If Goldman Sachs 
 
 
early 2007. One of the major CDO originators, Goldman Sachs accumulated a large short position in 
the mortgage-backed assets it was aggressively securitizing and marketing at the same time. See THE 
LEVIN REPORT, supra note 11, at 376–636. 
 284. It may be desirable to subject TBTF institutions to stricter scrutiny in the product approval 
process, with the goal of discouraging them from engaging in socially useless financial innovation. 
Thus, these large and sophisticated firms would have to meet a higher standard of proof with respect to 
their institutional capacity to manage the entire spectrum of risks in connection with the proposed 
activity.  
 285. A synthetic CDO references a pool of assets that consists of credit default swaps (CDS) 
instead of actual loans or securities. See Michael S. Gibson, Understanding the Risk of Synthetic CDOs 
(July 2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2004/200436/200436pap.pdf.  
 286. In April 2010, the SEC brought a lawsuit against Goldman Sachs, accusing the firm of 
intentionally misleading investors about the true risk profile of the ABACUS CDO and Paulson‘s 
direct involvement in the selection of the reference assets in the CDO. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm‘n, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $ 550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to 
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had to disclose the details of this transaction in order to receive a prior 
regulatory approval, as proposed in this Article, it would have faced 
significant difficulties in meeting both the economic purpose and the 
systemic effects tests. Even if such a CDO was structured not for 
Paulson‘s hedge fund but for commercial companies seeking to hedge 
their bona fide business exposure to residential housing prices (such as 
construction companies or real estate developers), the potentially 
destabilizing effect of this transaction on the U.S. housing market would 
have allowed the regulator to block the deal from going forward.
287
 
This test would explicitly bring in broader public policy considerations 
that the proposed new product potentially implicates. Many existing 
statutes mandate that financial regulators exercise their discretion only if 
doing so is in the public interest. This part of the product approval process 
is designed to allow for this type of deliberation, where the applicant firm 
bears the burden of proving that the financial instrument it seeks to market 
is not likely to have a negative impact on broader socioeconomic policies 
and political goals.
288
  
2. Scope and Structure 
Designing a system of mandatory product approval for complex 
financial instruments raises fundamental structural questions. Which 
financial products and transactions should be subject to the approval 
regime? Who should be required to apply for regulatory approval of a 
 
 
Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-
123.htm. In July 2010, Goldman Sachs settled the SEC‘s charges and agreed to pay $550 million and 
reform its business practices. Id.  
 287. The existing legal theories and concepts, such as investor protection or fiduciary duty, did not 
fully capture what was ―wrong‖ with Goldman Sachs‘ conduct in structuring the ABACUS deal. The 
proposed product approval scheme offers a potential alternative to using these and other traditional 
concepts in corporate and securities laws to fit more complex situations. 
 288. A quintessential example of a financial product banned on public policy grounds are 
terrorism futures, conceived in 2003 by Pentagon as a market-based predictor of the level of risk posed 
by terrorist attacks. Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, The Furor Over ‗Terrorism Futures,‘ WASH. 
POST, July 31, 2003, at A19. As the proponents of this product explained, 
The idea was simple: By creating a market in which people can buy and sell contracts that 
pay $100 if certain political events occur in the Middle East, we can infer from the price of 
such securities the probability of these outcomes. By explicitly pricing such risks, we can 
better understand them and better respond to them. 
Id. Despite this rhetoric, Congress discarded this idea on public policy grounds. In July 2011, the 
CFTC adopted a rule pursuant to section 745 of the Dodd-Frank Act prohibiting the listing and trading 
of contracts referencing ―terrorism, assassination, war, gaming, or an activity that is unlawful under 
any State or Federal law.‖ 17 C.F.R. § 40.11(a)(1) (2011). 
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specific product? Finally, who should be in charge of administering the 
approval scheme?  
a. ―Covered Products‖ 
Defining what exactly qualifies as a ―complex financial product‖ is 
perhaps the single most challenging task in designing an approval regime. 
On the one hand, there is a danger of creating an over-inclusive definition 
that may have a chilling effect on products with relatively low potential 
for causing systemic disruptions or increasing strategic complexity. On the 
other hand, by stressing specific product characteristics, this definition 
may be dangerously under-inclusive. Ultimately, developing a full set of 
detailed legal definitions is a task for lawmakers drafting new legislation 
and regulatory agencies implementing it. The following discussion aims 
only to sketch out possible approaches to that problem. 
As the basis for developing a statutory definition, it is possible to start 
with a group of ―Covered Products‖ that includes: (1) derivative 
instruments and structured products;
289
 (2) asset-backed securities and 
structures set up to issue such securities; and (3) any other financial 
transaction or instrument that, alone or in combination with other financial 
transactions or instruments, is determined by the regulator to constitute a 
―complex financial product‖ subject to mandatory approval.290 An 
alternative approach may be to define Covered Product broadly as any 
financial instrument or transaction and provide exceptions from that all-
inclusive category for (1) certain traditional deposit, credit, and investment 
products;
291
 and (2) any other financial instrument or transaction that the 
 
 
 289. There is no single legal definition of a ―structured product.‖ The term is generally used to 
refer to a financial instrument with payoff ―structured‖ to reflect specific risk exposure. A typical 
example is a debt security with a derivative component. 
 290. This catch-all category is designed to provide the regulator with the necessary flexibility to 
extend approval requirements to new types of complex financial products that may emerge in the 
future. 
 291. The statute may define each of these traditional financial products by enumerating specific 
criteria, using various existing legal definitions in banking and securities laws as a starting point. The 
key criteria, however, should be the absence of any derivative component, so that the value of the 
instrument and the payment rights and obligations are calculated on a simple basis and not by 
reference to the value of any other asset. Thus, a deposit account that pays interest at a specified fixed 
rate or a variable rate linked to certain commonly used benchmark interest rates would qualify as a 
―Traditional Deposit Product.‖ By contrast, a certificate of deposit with interest payments linked to the 
performance of a broad-based stock index would not constitute a Traditional Deposit Product and 
would be subject to pre-approval, unless exempted by regulation. Similarly, shares of common or 
preferred stock, where the return on such shares is not ―structured‖ to create a specific risk/return 
profile, would qualify as a ―Traditional Investment Product,‖ whereas an asset-backed security would 
not fall in that category. 
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regulators may exempt by regulation.
292
  
Another problem is how to define what constitutes a ―product‖ that 
requires a separate regulatory approval. A financial institution cannot 
apply for a blanket pre-approval of all ―swaps‖ or ―equity swaps‖ and 
proceed to structure and market a wide variety of such instruments with 
different risk profiles. Thus, one of the critical tasks in designing the new 
regulatory regime is to develop a set of criteria for determining when a 
particular instrument has sufficiently unique features to make it a separate 
―product.‖ As a first approximation, that list of factors should include key 
terms related to payment and other significant rights and obligations of the 
parties to the transaction, the nature of reference assets, and the intended 
uses for the instrument and target markets. To the extent any new version 
of a previously approved Covered Product contains a significant change in 
any of these terms, the financial institution planning to market it would 
have to make a written determination whether the changes alter the 
Covered Product‘s key features or overall risk profile significantly enough 
so as to require a separate regulatory approval.
293
 
Finding a workable solution to these definitional problems—where and 
how exactly to draw the lines between separate ―products‖ and which of 
those products should be subject to mandatory licensing—may be the key 
to the viability of the proposed scheme. Among other things, it would 
determine the volume of deals to be reviewed and approved by the 
regulator under the new regime. It is difficult to estimate the exact 
numbers at this point. However, given the size and diversity of today‘s 
financial markets, it is likely that regulators may be overwhelmed by the 
volume of products subject to the new licensing requirements.
294
 
It may be worth considering a specific exemption from mandatory pre-
approval for Covered Products actively traded on registered and regulated 
exchanges that meet certain criteria. Such an exemption would make the 
implementation of the statutory scheme more manageable by carving out a 
 
 
 292. Regulatory discretion to exempt certain financial instruments from the requirement of 
mandatory pre-approval is necessary to ensure the flexibility and adaptability of the regulatory regime 
in the dynamic market environment. Regulators‘ discretion, however, must be subject to certain 
conditions, both substantive and procedural. Thus, it is important that the regulators do not have the 
authority to grant exemptions by individual order or through informal interpretation. 
 293. If several previously approved Covered Products are used in a complex trading or investment 
strategy, that strategy itself may require separate approval as a new Covered Product. 
 294. This is one of the key differences between the proposed model and the CFTC‘s pre-CFMA 
contract designation scheme. The average volumes of futures that the CFTC had to review and 
approve were relatively low. For example, in December 1997, Brooksley Born stated that, since the 
spring of that year, exchanges submitted fifteen new contracts for the CFTC‘s approval. Brooksley 
Born, Derivatives and Risk Management: Keynote Address, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 763 (1997). 
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broad universe of financial products, including standardized exchange-
traded derivatives, with deep and liquid markets. To limit the potential risk 
of creating a dangerous loophole, however, it is important to tailor an 
exemption for such publicly traded Covered Products in a way that 
balances various policy considerations. 
The EU‘s experience with REACH offers valuable insight into 
designing a regulatory regime capable of managing a high volume of 
products. REACH calibrates regulation of different categories of 
chemicals depending on their volume and toxicity. Low-volume, low-risk 
substances are generally subject only to registration requirements, while 
potentially high-risk chemicals are subject to pre-market approval and 
even product bans. It may be desirable to apply a similar ―tiered‖ approach 
to licensing complex financial products. For instance, one way to 
differentiate among various products is to look at the firms‘ projections of 
the monetary value and volume of deals. If the firm expects to deal and 
trade in a particular Covered Product in the aggregate amount exceeding a 
certain threshold, it would have to undergo the full approval process and 
satisfy all three statutory tests. In all other cases, the proposed Covered 
Product would be exempt from pre-approval requirements.
295
 One 
potential concern with this approach is that it may be easy to evade 
regulation by breaking up big deals into separate transactions to fly under 
the regulatory radar. 
An alternative approach may be to create different tiers within the 
system depending on the characteristics of the financial institution, rather 
than the product it intends to market. Thus, all systemically important 
financial institutions (―SIFIs‖) would be subject to the most stringent form 
of the product approval regime, which would require them to obtain a 
license for all of their Covered Products. Because many SIFIs are likely to 
be considered TBTF, it may also be desirable to heighten the scrutiny of 
their products.
296
 Smaller, less diversified financial institutions that are less 
likely to be systemically significant may be subject to less stringent 
product approval requirements. This approach also raises significant 
concerns, especially because it is often difficult to identify which entities 
are ―systemically important‖ until it is too late. 
Another useful and commonly used regulatory technique is to phase in 
the application of product approval requirements, targeting the most 
 
 
 295. There can also be an intermediate category of products that require an abbreviated approval 
process, so that the firms would either have to satisfy some but not all of the statutory tests or 
otherwise bear a lighter burden of proof.  
 296. See supra note 284 and accompanying text. 
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systemically risky or significant financial products and institutions first 
and then gradually expand the scope of the regime to include other 
products and actors. This phase-in implementation would potentially allow 
for necessary adjustments along the way, as more information on the 
practical operation of the new regime becomes available. 
There is no guarantee that any of these mechanisms would succeed in 
making the proposed product approval regime more manageable without 
sacrificing its integrity. Combined with careful definitional carve-outs and 
narrowly tailored exemptions, however, they can serve as the basis for 
designing a practical solution to that problem. 
The mandatory product approval scheme would allow the creation of 
an individual identification and tracking system for complex financial 
instruments. Under that system, each approved Covered Product would be 
assigned a unique alpha-numerical identifier containing the key 
information about the product category, the financial institution that 
received regulatory approval to market it, and other relevant data.
297
 This 
system would allow consumers and regulators to trace the path of financial 
products or trading strategies to the institutions responsible for their 
origination. In addition to generating and organizing transactional data, it 
may heighten financial institutions‘ sensitivity to reputational risks 
associated with complex financial transactions. This tracking system 
would also make it easier for the authorities to conduct investigations and 
bring enforcement actions against individual institutions.
298
  
 
 
 297. This identifier would be similar to the CUSIP (Committee on Uniform Securities 
Identification Procedures) number assigned to each class of securities of the U.S. and Canadian 
publicly held companies and U.S. government and municipal bonds. The CUSIP system is owned by 
the American Bankers Association, administered by Standard & Poor‘s, and is used to facilitate the 
clearing and settlement of securities. See CUSIP Number, U.S. SEC & EXCH. COMM‘N, http://www.sec 
.gov/answers/cusip.htm (last visited May 12, 2012).  
 298. One of the problems during the recent financial crisis was that, in many instances of 
significant market failures, it was virtually impossible to establish the degree of any individual 
institution‘s fault, as many toxic products were continuously repackaged throughout the system, 
spreading and amplifying risk. The conspicuous lack of criminal prosecutions of Wall Street 
institutions and executives implicated in questionable deals that led to the crisis continues to draw 
significant public criticism and potentially undermines political legitimacy of financial regulation 
reforms. See Matt Taibbi, Why Isn‘t Wall Street in Jail?, ROLLING STONE, Feb. 16, 2011, http://www 
.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-isnt-wall-street-in-jail-20110216. In June 2012, the Financial 
Stability Board, an international body that coordinates national authorities‘ efforts to regulate financial 
systemic risks, announced an initiative to establish a global Legal Entity Identifier (―LEI‖) system that 
would assign unique alphanumeric identifiers to parties to financial transactions. Fin Stability Bd., A 
Global Legal Entity Identifier for Financial Markets (June 8, 2012), available at http://www 
.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120608.pdf. If successfully implemented, the LEI initiative 
would make financial transactions more transparent and may serve as the basis for developing a 
system of financial product identifiers.  
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b. ―Covered Institutions‖ 
The statute would impose the duty to apply for regulatory approval of 
each Covered Product on the ―Covered Institution‖ seeking to introduce 
the product into the market. Typically, that would be a financial 
intermediary that acts as an originator, issuer, underwriter, structurer, 
dealer or market-maker with respect to the Covered Product. In certain 
cases, two or more Covered Institutions—the issuer and the underwriter of 
a structured note, or the originator and the securitizer of an asset-backed 
instrument—may have to submit a joint approval application for the same 
Covered Product.
299
 
In principle, the product approval scheme envisioned here aims at 
financial intermediaries: commercial banks, securities firms, insurance 
companies, and their affiliates or subsidiaries specializing in derivatives 
and securitization activities. However, if a non-intermediary institution—
such as a hedge fund or a commercial company—wants to enter into 
complex financial transactions directly with other non-dealer entities, it 
would be a Covered Institution and would have to apply for regulatory 
approval of its proposed transactions. Such an entity will have to satisfy, 
among other things, the institutional capacity test. In effect, that would 
make such a fund or company subject to prudential requirements 
applicable to financial intermediaries. In other words, anyone can become 
an independent player in the markets for complex financial products, as 
long as they agree to be regulated for their ability to take on their financial 
risks. In practice, however, this approach is likely to preclude ―free 
dealing‖ in complex financial instruments. 
To strengthen this barrier to entry, it may be desirable to mandate 
registration of each Covered Institution as an ―Approved Dealer‖ in the 
specific Covered Product. There is a wide range of potential regulatory 
requirements that such registration may imply. It may serve merely as a 
recording device—a roster of all entities that successfully applied for 
approval of specific Covered Products. On the other end of the spectrum, 
registration as an Approved Dealer in any single Covered Product may 
subject an entity to stringent regulation with respect to its capital and 
liquidity levels, limits on leverage, conflicts of interest and affiliate 
transactions, internal risk management, customer relations, financial 
reporting, and regulatory examinations. Such an extensive regulatory and 
 
 
 299. In these situations, it may make sense for the financial institutions to designate one Covered 
Institution as the lead applicant. 
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supervisory regime would be largely parallel to the currently separate 
regimes for securities broker-dealers, commercial banks, savings 
associations, and other regulated intermediaries.
300
 As a practical matter, 
introducing a system of comprehensive regulation and supervision of 
Approved Dealers in Covered Products may necessitate a major structural 
reorganization of the financial services industry.
301
 Therefore, the 
advantages and disadvantages of such a system, and its potential 
interaction with the existing regulatory regimes for financial 
intermediaries, would require careful consideration and policy analysis. 
c. The Financial Product Approval Commission 
An important structural element of the proposed product approval 
regime is the choice of where to locate this new regulatory function. One 
option would be to grant this new regulatory power to one of the existing 
financial regulators. The Federal Reserve, the SEC, and the CFTC are the 
most likely candidates for this new role. However, this is likely to create a 
variety of complications and potential conflicts with other policy and 
regulatory goals of these agencies. The existing organizational culture may 
also significantly interfere with their ability to perform this new regulatory 
role. 
A better option would be to establish a new regulatory agency—the 
Financial Product Approval Commission (―FPAC‖)—charged specifically 
with the implementation and administration of the new statutory scheme. 
The new agency may be structured in different ways. To enhance its 
independence, it may be preferable to set it up as an independent 
commission, either multi-member or headed by a single Commissioner. It 
is critical that the newly established FPAC has highly skilled and well-
compensated staff, as well as sufficient resources to support the hiring of 
outside consultants, if necessary.
302
  
 
 
 300. The regulatory and supervisory requirements for registered Approved Dealers in Covered 
Products may be more stringent than general requirements for banks, securities firms or other financial 
intermediaries. For instance, given the heighten potential risks associated with complex financial 
instruments, it may be desirable to impose significantly higher capital adequacy and liquidity 
requirements on Approved Dealers than those mandated under the Basel III framework. See generally 
BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR 
MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (June 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/ 
publ/bcbs189.pdf.  
 301. Financial institutions may respond by ―pushing out‖ the bulk of their structuring and dealing 
in complex financial products into separate subsidiaries registered and regulated as Approved Dealers 
in Covered Products. To avoid negative effects of further regulatory fragmentation, broader structural 
reforms redefining existing regulatory categories may be necessary. 
 302. An important issue in this respect is the funding model for the new agency. To ensure greater 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
130 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:63 
 
 
 
 
A more interesting question is the scope of substantive jurisdiction of 
the new agency. There may be a strong argument for combining the new 
product approval function with the broader oversight of systemic risk in 
the financial services sector. The Dodd-Frank Act created a new 
interagency body, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (―FSOC‖), to 
fulfill this function.
303
 Reassigning the systemic risk oversight 
responsibilities to the FPAC would require a major restructuring of the 
Dodd-Frank framework, which may be too disruptive. On the other hand, 
there are legitimate reasons to doubt the practical efficacy of the FSOC 
and the entire emerging systemic risk regulation regime. Thus, it may be 
too early to foreclose a thorough discussion of alternative substantive and 
structural solutions to the problem of systemic risk regulation. 
Another dilemma arises if the new product approval regime also 
involves mandatory registration and comprehensive regulation of 
Approved Dealers in Covered Products. To the extent the FPAC 
administers this new system of centralized oversight of Approved Dealers, 
there may be jurisdictional overlaps and conflicts between the new agency 
and the SEC, CFTC, federal and state bank regulators, and state insurance 
regulators. Resolving these conflicts is likely to require a fundamental 
reorganization of the existing fragmented, silo-based regulation and 
supervision of financial intermediaries. This type of institutional reform is 
challenging and politically difficult. The idea of regulating and 
supervising all financial institutions that create, market, and trade complex 
financial products under a single statutory scheme, however, may create 
the basis for a much-needed overhaul of the current regulatory structure.
304
 
Finally, an interesting issue to consider is how the FPAC would 
interact with, and affect the functioning of, the recently established CFPB. 
There is a fertile ground for extensive cooperation and coordination 
between these two agencies. Many Covered Products may directly or 
 
 
political independence and ample financial resources, it may be desirable to fund the FPAC‘s activities 
through industry assessments. On the other hand, funding through Congressional appropriations may 
better insulate the agency from private industry influence.  
 303. Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 111, 124 Stat. at 139294 (codified at 12 
U.S.C.A. § 5321 (West Supp. 2011)) (establishing the FSOC). The voting members of the FSOC, 
headed by the Secretary of the Treasury, include the heads of the key financial regulatory agencies, 
such as the Federal Reserve, the SEC, the CFTC, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(―OCC‖). Id.  
 304. A more general objection to the proposed structure is that the creation of yet another federal 
agency would further complicate the already fragmented system of financial services regulation. This 
is a legitimate concern that further underscores the importance of broader structural reforms, which 
would streamline and reassign jurisdictional functions among various government agencies in a 
manner consistent with the realities of today‘s financial marketplace. A discussion of these broader 
reforms is beyond the scope of this Article.  
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indirectly affect consumer markets or be directly subject to the CFPB‘s 
jurisdiction. To the extent the CFPB does not possess explicit product 
approval powers, however, there is a limited potential for jurisdictional 
conflicts between these agencies. 
3. Procedural Issues; Enforcement 
Product review and approval is a form of agency adjudication that 
would have to satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the Due 
Process Clause
305
 and the Administrative Procedure Act (the ―APA‖).306 
The enabling statute and the FPAC‘s rules would set forth the specific and 
detailed procedural requirements governing the agency review and 
decision-making with respect to product approval applications.
307
 
a. Review Process 
The statute would have to specify general timeframes for agency 
action. For example, the statute could require that the FPAC make a final 
decision on each application—by issuing either an Approval Order or an 
Order of Denial—within ninety days of its receipt, but may extend the 
review period for up to three additional ninety-day periods, if doing so is 
necessary to make a fully informed decision and the agency notifies the 
applicant in writing of each extension.
308
  
The applicant entity would bear the burden of showing that the 
proposed product meets all of the statutory and regulatory criteria for 
approval. To facilitate its deliberations, the FPAC would have the right to 
request any additional information from the applicant, engage in 
 
 
 305. The agency adjudication would need to satisfy the Due Process Clause, because a decision to 
deny approval for a specific product may potentially be viewed as a ―deprivation‖ of the applicant‘s 
―property‖ rights. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 27–39 (2008) (discussing the 
applicability of the Due Process Clause to agency adjudications). 
 306. 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (2006). The enabling statute, however, does not need to require the 
approval agency to engage in a formal adjudication ―on the record after opportunity for agency 
hearing.‖ 5 U.S.C. § 554(a).  
 307. It is important that the FPAC has extensive rule-making authority in order to be able to 
continue adapting the product approval regime to evolving market conditions. 
 308. The financial industry is likely to resist any such timeframes as unacceptably long. As the 
CFTC‘s experience demonstrates, even a ten-day review period was too much of a delay from the 
industry actors‘ perspective. See supra notes 239–42 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, it is crucial 
to allow the regulator an opportunity to complete the review process giving full consideration to all 
interests involved, including the public interest in protecting systemic stability. In many situations, the 
FPAC may arrive at a decision well before the maximum statutory review period expires. In addition, 
applicants may have a right to request an expedited review of their application, on the basis of specific 
evidence that such an expedited review is warranted. 
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consultations with outside experts, hold formal or informal hearings, and 
take any other action it deems necessary. By submitting an application for 
product approval, each Covered Institution would be deemed to have 
agreed to cooperate with the FPAC and to submit all additional 
information, as requested by the agency, and failure to do so would 
constitute grounds for an automatic Order of Denial. 
In its discretion, the FPAC would have the authority to impose 
conditions on approval of any specific product. For instance, the FPAC 
could require the applicant to make specific changes to the terms of the 
proposed financial product. This element of the proposed scheme is 
similar to the pre-2000 CEA provisions that granted the CFTC the power 
to mandate changes to futures contracts.
309
 Unlike the CFTC, however, the 
FPAC would merely condition approval on the applicant‘s compliance 
with the agency‘s request for specific changes; it would not have the 
authority to mandate such changes unilaterally. If the applicant and the 
agency fail to agree on the necessary changes, the agency would have 
discretion to issue an Order of Denial. 
When necessary, the FPAC would have the power to grant a 
conditional approval allowing the applicant to test-market the proposed 
product for a specified period of time, subject to various limitations.
310
 The 
FPAC‘s Order of Conditional Approval would define the length of the trial 
period and specify the requirements and conditions to be satisfied in order 
for the applicant to obtain a final Approval Order for the product at the end 
of such trial period. During the trial period, the firm would be required to 
gather and analyze the relevant market data, which would provide an 
empirical basis for the FPAC‘s re-evaluation of the product. In principle, 
this is similar to the FDA‘s post-approval testing and review311 and 
Professor Carpenter‘s earlier proposal involving a limited roll-out for 
consumer financial products.
312
 It is important, however, to realize the 
inherent difficulty of conducting tightly controlled limited roll-out 
experiments in the financial market. If a product has negative systemic 
consequences, even a single transaction may cause irreversible damage to 
the stability of the entire financial system. Moreover, most complex and 
 
 
 309. See supra notes 226–28 and accompanying text. 
 310. For example, the FPAC may require that the applicant enter into the proposed transaction 
with, or sell the proposed financial product to, a limited number of target users that meet certain 
criteria. The applicant may also be required to set aside additional capital and liquidity cushion for 
trading and dealing in such conditionally approved instruments. 
 311. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 312. See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text. 
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potentially risky financial instruments are structured as bespoke 
instruments, not meant for mass marketing. 
The FPAC‘s Orders of Denial would be subject to judicial review in 
the same manner as similar decisions made by other administrative 
agencies. It is important, however, to avoid excessive and prolonged 
litigation of the FPAC‘s decisions. The well-funded and organized 
financial services industry, which stands to lose a great deal of profits 
under the proposed product approval regime, is likely to fight the FPAC at 
every turn and challenge the agency‘s every decision.313 Designing 
procedural rules governing the product approval process would require a 
careful balancing of legitimate due process concerns against the need to 
prevent potential abuses of procedural rights by private interests seeking to 
undermine the new regime.
314
 
Establishing a fair and effective process of administrative review of the 
FPAC‘s Orders of Denial may provide a viable alternative to litigation. 
Thus, it may make sense to establish internal appeals panels that would 
hear aggrieved applicants‘ appeals of the FPAC‘s orders. Such panels may 
be presided over by Administrative Law Judges and include not only 
FPAC employees but also outside experts and representatives.  
b. Public Advisory Council 
The FDA‘s practice of using independent expert councils suggests a 
potentially fruitful method of leveraging the FPAC‘s resources and 
introducing an important element of tripartism into the product approval 
process.
315
 The FPAC could establish the Public Advisory Council (the 
―Council‖) specifically charged with representing an independent public 
interest perspective in the process of licensing individual financial 
products. The Council would comprise individuals who are independent 
from both the industry and regulators and who are competent in issues of 
financial regulation, such as academic experts, but also certain public 
 
 
 313. See, e.g., Brush, supra note 280 (describing recent industry lawsuits against the CFTC). 
 314. Again, it is critical that the statute leaves little ambiguity with respect to its policy priorities.  
To this end, Congress may have to mandate a strong explicit presumption against excessive 
complexity of financial products and to place the burden of overcoming that statutory presumption on 
the Covered Institutions applying for approval of specific Covered Products. 
 315. For a discussion of the role of tripartism in financial services regulation, see Saule T. 
Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in Financial Services 
Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621 (2012).  
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figures (not holding any official post) and representatives of consumer and 
other public interest groups.
316
 
The Council would function much like the FDA‘s scientific expert 
committees.
317
 Its members would participate in the review and approval 
process, along with the FPAC‘s staff. The Council would provide an 
independent intellectual perspective on substantive and policy issues, 
which is a key factor in overcoming deep cognitive effects of complexity 
on regulators‘ thought process and in counteracting the tendencies toward 
agency ossification and parochialism.
318
 As an active third-party 
participant in the regulatory process, the Council would serve as a 
safeguard of the integrity of that process and a mechanism diminishing the 
threat of regulatory capture.
319
 
The creation of such an advisory body raises difficult issues with 
respect to the process and criteria for selecting its members, the scope of 
its powers and responsibilities, and the confidentiality of product-related 
information. The FDA‘s independent expert committees could provide a 
model for working out the operational details of the system.  
c. Enforcement 
The statute would generally prohibit offering to enter, or entering into, 
a financial transaction directly or indirectly involving any Covered 
Product in the absence, or not in accordance with the terms, of a valid 
Approval Order issued by the FPAC with respect to such Covered 
Product. Such transactions would be deemed void and unenforceable. The 
statute would provide broad rescission rights and rights to sue for damages 
to all third parties who, in good faith and without prior knowledge of the 
violation, entered into such illegal transactions. 
The statute would also provide a full range of familiar penalties, such 
as monetary fines, disgorgement of profits from the illegal transaction, and 
criminal liability for certain reckless or intentional violations. In addition, 
the FPAC would have the authority to impose a wide range of 
administrative sanctions, including imposition of specific prohibitions or 
restrictions on business activities of the violating financial institutions and 
 
 
 316. See id.; see also Carpenter, supra note 108. 
 317. See supra notes 143–50 and accompanying text. 
 318. For a thoughtful argument on the importance of an independent intellectual perspective for 
improving agency decision-making, see McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 91. 
 319. See Omarova, supra note 315. 
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partial or total exclusion of such institutions and their individual 
executives and employees from the market.
320
 
B. But Would It Work? Potential Challenges and Criticisms 
This Part outlines some of the key elements of the proposed regulatory 
regime. Much of this discussion seeks to identify important issues that 
require further analysis, rather than provide a complete design blueprint. 
Undoubtedly, this proposal is likely to face serious implementation 
challenges and invite numerous criticisms. 
1. Financial Innovation and Global Competitiveness 
Perhaps the most common criticism of any reform proposal involving 
government pre-approval of financial instruments is that it would stifle 
financial innovation and hurt the global competitiveness of the U.S. 
financial markets and institutions. As the examples of the FDA and 
REACH show, this is a typical argument private industry actors use to 
attack product approval regulation in any setting.
321
 Despite being framed 
in purely economic terms, this objection is based on a normative 
assumption that financial innovation and uninhibited growth of financial 
markets are inherently beneficial and that their social utility is never to be 
questioned. Therefore, the argument goes, the purpose of government 
regulation should not be to interfere with financial innovation, but to 
enable and support it.  
Without denying the many benefits of financial innovation, it is critical 
to remember that these phenomena can also cause significant economic 
and social harms. The recent crisis demonstrated that unregulated financial 
innovation can impose an unacceptably high price on society and, 
especially, on its poorest members. The proposed product approval 
scheme would not aim to stop all innovation. It would seek to control it in 
order to ensure that only those innovations that are likely to produce real 
economic benefits enter the market. To the extent this approach would 
―stifle‖ unproductive financial speculation and arbitrage, it may strengthen 
 
 
 320. This is typically achieved through revoking professional licensing and similar measures. If 
the FPAC is set up to exercise comprehensive regulatory and supervisory oversight of the new 
category of Approved Dealers in Covered Products, such market exclusion would involve temporary 
suspension or termination of the offender‘s registration as an Approved Dealer.  
 321. See, e.g., Adelman, supra note 132, at 404 (discussing how large, globally-active chemical 
manufacturers lobbied against REACH). 
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the long-term resilience and viability of the financial system and broader 
economy. 
Maintaining global competitiveness presents a more difficult challenge. 
Large financial institutions operate on a global scale and may easily 
relocate their activities abroad in search of a less stringent regulatory 
environment. There is often a trade-off between the policy goal of making 
domestic markets more competitive and the goal of making those markets 
safer and more stable in the long run. A thoughtfully designed product 
approval regime could provide a framework for balancing these competing 
policy considerations in the context of specific financial activities. 
Ultimately, however, establishing a successful product approval regime in 
the United States may require coordinated efforts to create similar regimes 
in the key non-U.S. financial markets.
322
  
2. ―Command-and-Control‖ Regulation 
Another potential criticism of the proposed product approval scheme is 
that it represents a paternalistic and obsolete ―command-and-control‖ 
regulatory approach that is ill-suited for today‘s complex and dynamic 
financial marketplace. Some variations of this argument may target 
primarily the conceptual underpinnings of this proposal and extol the 
dynamic adaptive qualities of complex systems or, on a more concrete 
level, the virtues of a more collaborative regulatory regime involving all 
stakeholders as equal participants. Other variations of this argument may 
emphasize investor autonomy as a normative ideal or express distrust of 
the government‘s ability to make better economic decisions.  
These are all valid arguments. Product approval regulation is inherently 
a top-down process, whereby the government controls market entry. In 
that sense, it is paternalistic and has ―command-and-control‖ elements. At 
the same time, however, the proposed product approval scheme is 
designed to operate primarily as a burden-shifting device rather than a 
direct prohibition on individual products. It does not automatically deprive 
financial institutions of vital business opportunities; it merely cures the 
inherent informational asymmetry between private firms and government 
regulators. 
 
 
 322. This problem is likely to accompany any significant domestic regulatory reforms in the 
financial services market. For an analysis of the complex architecture and dynamics of international 
financial regulation, see Christopher J. Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (And How 
It Doesn‘t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257 (2011). 
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From a practical standpoint, it is difficult to envision a workable near-
term solution to the problem of regulating an increasingly complex 
financial system which would not rely at least on some form of ―hard‖ 
legal constraints on the excessive risk-taking and speculation that such 
complexity enables.
323
 Because reducing systemic complexity has 
significant potential to enhance both financial stability and market 
efficiency, instituting an ex ante product approval regime is better viewed 
as a pragmatic approach that defies simple ideological labels. 
3. Feasibility Challenges 
Finally, the critics of the proposed product approval scheme may 
emphasize various technical and conceptual difficulties with designing and 
implementing it. For instance, it is difficult to delineate precisely the scope 
of the scheme‘s application, or to define with sufficient specificity what 
constitutes an acceptable ―economic purpose‖ of a complex financial 
instrument. This indeterminacy directly affects potential costs and overall 
viability of suggested reforms. Although this Article acknowledges and 
addresses some of these issues, it does not purport to offer complete 
solutions. Its purpose is to examine the basic concept of product licensing 
and to offer a general approach to operationalizing it in the context of 
financial services regulation.  
It is also true that introducing a comprehensive product approval 
regime is likely to be an expensive undertaking. Yet, whatever the ultimate 
price tag of these reforms, it will pale in comparison with the potential 
aggregate cost—monetary, social, and political—of another major 
financial crisis. The world‘s leading economies simply cannot afford 
another crisis of the same, or greater, magnitude as the last one. The costs 
and benefits of this proposal should be assessed against that alternative. 
Another potential challenge is the regulators‘ ability to administer a 
comprehensive product approval regime in practice. Financial regulators 
have lost credibility in recent years in light of the evidence of regulatory 
capture, incompetence, and complacency in the pre-crisis era.
324
 To many, 
 
 
 323. In certain contexts, traditional command-and-control regulatory methods may produce 
greater benefits than market-based economic incentives. See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. 
Grossman, When Is Command-And-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative 
Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887 
(1999) (arguing that command-and-control environmental regulation can be, and has been, more 
efficient than alternative market-based approaches). 
 324. See, e.g., THE LEVIN REPORT, supra note 11, at 161–243 (detailing how the Office of Thrift 
Supervision consistently failed to prevent highly risky business practices at Washington Mutual, the 
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the idea of regulatory agencies as effective gatekeepers, especially in the 
complex and dynamic area of finance, may appear naïve and misguided.
325
 
While regulatory capacity is a legitimate concern, it is hardly unique to the 
current proposal.
326
 Any regulatory regime may fail if the agencies are not 
able or willing to implement it efficiently and responsibly. How to 
improve regulators‘ capacity and incentives to act in the public interest is 
an intensely debated question that is not likely to have a simple answer.
327
 
Yet, it may be easier for the real-life imperfect regulators to cope with the 
complexity of their regulatory terrain if the law imposes the burden of 
explaining and justifying the need for such complexity on private market 
participants who generate it.  
As discussed above, implementation of the proposed product approval 
scheme may require significant reform of the broader system of financial 
sector regulation. Reorganizing and rationalizing the complex and 
fragmented regulatory framework requires the presence of strong political 
will, which does not appear likely in the near term.
328
 At the same time, 
however, the political climate may change unexpectedly, often in response 
to an economic crisis or another exogenous shock.
329
 In the meantime, it is 
important to continue exploring the possibilities for devising more 
effective regulatory mechanisms to reduce systemic risk in the financial 
sector.  
 
 
largest thrift under its jurisdiction). 
 325. See, e.g., Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1263 (2011) (arguing that state insurance regulators often fail to review homeowners insurance 
policies in an effective manner). 
 326. See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: the Unfulfilled 
Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683 (2011) (detailing the Federal 
Reserve‘s practice of granting banks exemptions from statutory restrictions on affiliate transactions). 
 327. See, e.g., PREVENTING CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION, AND HOW 
TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds.,  2012); McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 91. 
 328. See Linda Feldmann, Pew Survey: Partisan polarization in U.S. hits 25-year high, THE 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 4, 2012), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2012/ 
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types of speculative financial transactions. Thus, in November 2011, the European Parliament adopted 
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4. Informational Screening as a Potential Alternative 
Given the various feasibility challenges described above, it may be 
prudent to consider less radical alternatives to the proposed approach. One 
such alternative measure could be the establishment of a purely 
informational pre-market product screening regime.
330
 As discussed above, 
one of the key benefits of an ex ante product approval regime is the 
mandatory shifting of the burden to produce crucial information about the 
products to the financial institutions designing and marketing them.
331
 It 
may be possible to retain these informational benefits of an ex ante 
product review without necessarily giving the regulators the power to 
prohibit the marketing of any product. Better informational access should 
improve the government‘s ability to regulate financial markets more 
effectively and to take timely action with respect to potentially 
troublesome systemic trends.
332
 The need to explain the purposes and the 
nature of the financial products to the regulators should deter financial 
institutions from creating instruments likely to raise too many difficult 
questions. The firms would be expected to try to avoid negative comments 
by the regulators reviewing their products, because it may lead to further 
regulatory inquiries and tarnish the firm‘s reputation.  
It is far from certain, however, that a purely informational regulatory 
review of financial products, not backed by direct statutory authority to 
stop them from entering the market, is likely to achieve its proclaimed 
objectives. It is not clear what level of scrutiny would be appropriate for 
this type of ―soft‖ regulatory review and, more importantly, what effect 
regulators‘ findings would have on financial intermediaries‘ ability to 
increase systemic complexity, interconnectedness, and risk. Without a 
clear threat of regulatory prohibition of the proposed activity, financial 
institutions that stand to profit from such activity will be less forthcoming 
with the relevant information. In the context of a purely information-
gathering review, it would be more difficult for the regulators to justify 
their demands for further disclosure and discussions over firms‘ 
 
 
 330. See, e.g., P. M. Vasudev, Credit Derivatives and the Dodd-Frank Act: Is the Regulatory 
Response Appropriate? (Jan. 13, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1984878 (proposing a pre-market screening procedure for financial 
products).  
 331. See supra notes 277–80 and accompanying text. 
 332. Given this link to systemic risk regulation, it may make sense to assign this pre-market 
review function to the FSOC or the OFR, although that would require significant reconfiguration of 
their current structure and duties.  
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complaints about unnecessary and meaningless delays. Routinely issued 
pre-market regulatory comments on potential risks of individual financial 
products, without any binding legal power, are likely to be ignored by 
market participants and even the regulators themselves, especially in times 
of rising asset prices.
333
  
Altering the financial services industry‘s conduct requires powerful and 
tangible deterrents.
334
 In effect, a pre-screening regime would act purely as 
―disinfecting sunlight‖335 and leave far more room for a variety of 
responses, public and private, to the uncovered information. It is doubtful, 
though, that, without a ―well-oiled shotgun behind the door,‖336 any such 
responses will be effective enough to prevent the excessive accumulation 
of systemic risk and avert the next financial crisis.
337
 
CONCLUSION 
This Article explores the possibility of creating a system of mandatory 
pre-approval of complex financial products as an ex ante solution to the 
problem of systemic risk containment. Building on the concept of 
regulatory precaution borrowed from environmental and health law, and 
elements of pre-CFMA regulation of commodity futures, the Article 
outlines the broad contours of a new licensing scheme that would place the 
burden of proving social and economic utility of complex financial 
instruments on the intermediaries that structure and market them. 
Fundamentally a thought experiment, this proposal seeks to enrich the 
current policy debate by expanding the range of potentially plausible 
reform options.  
 
 
 333. In our fragmented system of financial regulation, one can easily imagine a situation where 
the agencies or staff responsible for prudential regulation and supervision of financial institutions 
would go about their daily duties without much regard for the non-binding commentary by the 
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